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== Up ==
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* [[Phenomenology of Spirit/Mind]]
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== Introduction ==
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The subject of this talk started as a response to [[User:Kai|Kai Froeb]]'s `Is the Phenomenology recommended as introduction to Hegel's System.'Few clarifications and my intent needs to be stated.My intent has been to primarily emphasize the relevance of Phenomenology of Spirit/Mind 1806/07 [ hereafter PhS]by showing some anomalies that are singular only to PhS.It also includes modifying the first chapter on Sense-Experience that made Hegel uncomfortable later. The justification,however,pertains to philosophical knowledge that is found in the opening sections of the book from the chapters sense-experience to self-consciousness. It needs be said that Kant pursued the question  of justifying reason and knowledge unlike anyone, other than Plato.Kant  started with sense-experience,which he saw as prior to nature, as spontaneously `free without cause'. This fitted well with Enlightenment's empiricist, reductive/deductive, sensationalist, physicalist epistemic boundary in Kant's endeavor to find among the least or the lowest a confirmation of Enlightenment sensibility.Kant saw the world of things with its co-relate individualistic atomism as a state about which we cannot know anything.To him experience was limited by abstract understanding where he stopped.The world of thing hood, said Kant is the nominal of which nothing could be known. We could, at best believe in them but that is not knowledge. Consequently, by limiting or cutting knowledge down Kant made room for faith.Even in matters of faith the question of God's existence was undecidable.Hegel observed that for Kant things were externally related by understanding before its disappearance into nothing. For consciousness , this was made into an illustration for pointing towards Kant's limit in various modes of expressiveness though formal-abstract relations had an absolute limit for the dialectical unfolding of consciousness similar in terms for producing  sensitivity that irrupts when Hegel would show a clear progression from quantity [external relations] to quality. As for the manifold of external relations,they were doomed to pass away.To Kant, thing hood is a finite moment proceeding with non-things and this latter negative conditioned the first moment of vanishing. God, on the other hand was non-finite in the advanced level of concept-existence. Hegel said of Kant that `knowledge has reached a conclusion that it knows nothing.
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Let me hasten to add that if the issue at hand pertains to people who read PhS as Hegel's main work, the `real thing' without proceeding any further in the direction of post-Jena works then the worthies are chasing a chimera. Besides, to approach PhS directly without ever reading early Hegel, if not direct then at least through Lukas,Dilthy or H S Harris' work, is a disastrous start.Again if a perception informs that the reception of PhS is unusually overwhelming at the expanse of Science of Logic and Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences among Anglo-Saxon and  French readers then Kai's corrective makes good deal of sense. This is difficult to believe about the Francophone world, who may otherwise be disinclined towards Hegel and Hegel studies, in a way understandable instead of waiving PhS above all.
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Yet it is also conceivable that within the tendency or/and discipline of phenomenological research, which has a long tradition in French inquiry, PhS may have emerged with some show.In that case we are not really talking about Hegel.It is somewhat pathetic to see the French `intellectual tradition' persisting with disregard or indifference towards their own enthusiastic reception of Hegel in his lifetime [V Cousins], Claude Bernard's lucid , brief exposition about Hegel,some of Ludwig Michelet's unsurpassed commentaries, somebody who was faithful to the meaning in Hegel's systematic philosophy Vera's expositions/commentaries on Hegel, de Velliers metaphysical grasp and many from the ranks of the truly best,kindred traditions of 19h c. French culture.  In the 20th c. that long 19th c. tradition came under a vicious attack from positivism, which was sealed by ww1.I  would not make a similar argument about the traditions of the Anglo-Saxon world though what maybe seen as somewhat alarming is a surfacing and growing super-ego type dismissing of Hegel. Neither does it have that bit of wit and wisdom to sustain the barbs and the none too subtle homologous `consensus based' post modern's dressed up invectives on Hegel.Again, the significance of of  parallel tendencies too must be active but that life has been truly miserable, unhappy [consciousness]. Well case of idiosyncrasy on the nationalist side for quiet a few, to have seen the `chief Hegelian' of 20th c. in the person of A Kojeve.
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While the `meaning of Geistes in German as equally Spirit and Mind is an example of the anomalous there seems as a bias, not German though from the side of Hegel scholarship in Germany. This comes up unexpectedly in Kai's preference, not his motive. I remember reading one article of his on Hegelianism in Germany which makes it clear that institutionally Germany is way ahead in Hegel studies,iterative publications like Yearbooks and archival resources in a comparative sense.Though that alone need not show up in either the quality of books, articles and the sort of sweep and wisdom for judgment of a magisterial kind, what it does is indicating uneven and skewed distribution of resources on Hegel. It is far easier to those knowing good German to access a good deal of Hegel's  than it would be in the Anglo-Saxon world.Even Hegel's `Differenz' essay on Schelling and Fichte cannot be easily accessed in English. Sure this would not bother most University based Hegel scholars and `specialists' but when it comes to the bigger intermediate level these things matter.Other than that, sensitivity towards translated versions in any single language, say Italian or Japanese seems amiss and the reason for that has little to do with authenticity, chanted by purists. It may have more to do with the ring of`philological fetishism' around `the written stuff'.The demand for so-called `exactitude' , accuracy or reading the original German version is quiet unlike the spirit of Hegel who was not only not a purist Cartesian in matters of linguistic composition. He considered philology as soft corpus of science.       
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  Hello and good wishes to one and all,
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After scribbling palimpsest jotting primitives to approximate  the opening chapter of Hegel's Phenomenology,it became clear that starting with pure immediacy as indicated by `this', `what',`that', not-this, not what',`not-that' means a simple twofold ~ being is as non-being is.The cardinal importance of Hegel's Jena Phenomenology is in pushing the justification of all philosophy beyond abstract experience of understanding.Mind/Spirit experiences immediacy and pushes beyond the limits of understanding towards theoretical reason. `This' can only be if `non-this' and  `not-this' if be `this'.In language, to say `this is' would already grant a movement to the `is' as something more or less of `that'.Phenomenology would have no other justification other than other than beginning with experiencing. 
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There are no suppositions,axioms to prove `this'and not-this. That you have eyes to see white that is enough. Here the presupposition is also as posited.The road up and down are the same. The same is posited in the up and down What is posited is a simple movement.The beginning and end is the same . The same is the unity as  becoming.The thing, in that it is,is not and in that it is not, is.Inquiry into the self or when self looks within consciousness finds the interposition/-change of the two in the unity , becoming.This is the truth that comes from inwardness or inquiry into self. However, being is only a determinate abstract as becoming shows up as simple unity.As equal abstractions both find no further unfolding in  the absence of concept. This is when reason, ''nous'', irrupts like a contingency/accident in the self. Reason takes the abstract unity of becoming by negating the abstract and unfolds as the negative unity.This is the next elevation from becoming.Self conscious reason experiences the truth in the becoming/same.Reason is common to all even when most humans prove uncomprehending because they make as if they had an understanding of their own.But thinking is common to all and inquiry into oneself shows this thinking beyond understanding as reason as the unity of self-consciousness. Reason grasps that nothing as the concept that makes `this' of the sense as a determinate `this' by keeping the truth of becoming of perception.
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But the level of perception can only have the truth by removing the immediacy of senses. Perception preserves sense-experience by annulling its immediacy without annihilating it.The term [[`sublate']] means to preserve/keep the predecessor by ceasing its immediacy so what is kept is negative, as mediation.In perception, empirical consciousness remains sublated. Even when it is radicalized, empirical consciousness in the discrete, heterogeneous scale is operative and limited to understanding. Theoretical reason goes beyond empirical understanding,  under the terms of rational consciousness.
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The `dialectic of sense-certainty' like natural consciousness is the `simple history of its movement.[ Ref. [[Pinkard, Terry, Phenomenology of Mind']], Zusatz,109, put in single quotes] What is learnt from experience is easily forgotten and erroneous sequences repeat themselves. Through the medium of consciousness, reason makes the simple abstraction that in this truth of experience lies the truth all of experiences.Yet the very vastness of experience coming and ceasing in the abyss of duration cannot be enveloped by perception and reason.Like the first contact that initiates by opening a dimension that is invisible, reason steps in not to designate the invisible as absolute but establish the level of perception that sustains the visible of sense experience.Invisible inheres in the world to sustain the visible.
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The reception of being passes by the action of thinking into the phenomenal world. The plenitude  of being is external for all.
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The determinate nothing remains an active nothing after the `double sublation' of becoming and abstract understanding. It is as though one expects the unexpected ; there is no unexpected sans expecting for there is no known passage to access it. Speculation is the movement of reason needed to get to the unexpected or unknown. This is where conditions for dialectical movement shows up clearly for consciousness as it reflects in relation to itself and  registers a transformation of movement into dialectical self-unfolding.
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What is said as of relates to a mode of sublation externalizing what gets preserved open to  influences and that which was caused to cease or ended would be the neomatic  curvature resembling a non-linear "''movement'' of returning back to itself, reflection into self or a self-relation of inner time-dialectic. By now the break with Kant's aporias, antinomies is crystal clear.He saw the `act of experience' as free act, `prior to  natural cause' in the observations on the `third antinomy' ['''Critique of Pure Reason''', Miklejohn tr., p. 2375 ff]
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Phenomenology may not easily find  a place in university `reading lists' nor can it be thrust upon someone since it is not an easy book to teach from the lectern or pulpit.Nor was the book really written exclusively for universities since it addressed the wider concerns of '''Bildung.'''.This figures in Hegels Philosophical Propadeutic [1808-11] to be taught in the middle class/form/section in school `The subject of mind/spirit is phenomenal when essentially relating to an existing object, insofar as it is consciousness.' Mind which is spontaneously active within itself as self-referential gets a step higher, for the next, highest level, as Psychology.
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== PHENOMENOLOGY AS INTERNAL TO HEGEL'S OEUVRE ==
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PhS is is like a stepping stone for introduction to Hegel's systematic philosophy for reasons such as : a]suitable for middle level education equivalent to `civil society' that is prior to the next level, Logic/Encyclopedia; b] it is a lively exposition pulsating with the dialectic as  a method of movement and as an organizing principle of scientific exposition;c]almost all the concepts of Hegel's system prefigure with considerable clarity in PhS; d] teaches critical method in the movement from one field to the next with precision and economy of thought;e] prefiguring almost all the subjects of Hegel's systemic philosophy in terms of the notion/concept as unfolding;f]data structures from history bereft of their individuality and shown to belong to the movement of self-consciousness as the truth of historical `facts', which opens up another dimension of historical inquiry into the presupposed ''res gestae'' or the subdued voice in silence;g]as a book standing on its own not for reasons of any `system' but in the anti-systemic sense.
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Hegel could read like those gifted by nature, and freed from innocence and guilt.The two main concerns of Hegel in his lifetime were religion/church and state/despotism. During his youth Hegel was openly talking about the church that practices the despotism of the state. Following from this concern, Hegel's legacy was immediately political.PhS can be read as political critique of modern theology. `What in religion was ''content'', as the form of representing the other is ''self's own activity''.[PhS # 797]
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The philosophy of his age arose from the need that conditions of civil society produced estrangement, oppositions and prevalent antagonisms.Instead of a possession qualified subjectively, consciousness for Hegel is  the restless indwelling spirit in terms of individuality and as the indwelling spirit of community throbbing with life and inconceivable as standing apart from the `sociality of reason'.
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This response is sensitive to historical contexts, durations and time especially when the subject is Hegel, whose life mysteriously co-coincided with historical drifts.
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In the language of PhS it is thinking that speaks to itself and equally listens, which arranges density, clears confusions in the manner of the incipient language  of early Greek philosophy, rich in phonetic attributes.Hegel used native dialects and vernacular traditions that may be seem unrefined and uncouth grammatically.Yet great moments of spirit's journey may be lying precisely in those regions.Urges and instinct are more than ambivalent when they end up saying `yes' and `no' at the same time.These paradoxicals come on their own through the medium of instincts and Hegel, it seems, hardly reversed his `urges' though they were kept as negative moments of dialectic.
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I know this may sound trite but not without its worth to state the only other book that Hegel wrote was Science of Logic. The influence of PhS over Science of Logic could only be seen as refractive and/or ethereal. Science of Logic has PhS as its presupposition but in its own movement,the moments stand opposed to sensuous, figurative and opposing consciousness [ subject-object to subject-subject relations]is presupposed in Science of Logic.The method of Philosophy consists in its being freed from oppositions of consciousness showing up in the phenomenal worlds, which is quiet different from `freeing the mind from misconceptions'.
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The metaphor `ladder' can be thrown away after climbing the last step, as suggested by Wittgenstein. Here, Kai does not provide the consequential logic of the `ladder'; should it be kept, internalized or thrown away, externalized or what? The formulation also begets  answer to the question why didn't Hegel extend whatever he did write  his earlier piece titled ''Philosophie der Geistes''' to the Phenomenology?
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Kai's  argument is that PhS was hurriedly written by Hegel whereas in the earlier writings, the subjects - logic, nature,spirit/mind/history/aesthetics - make a better template for reading all that Hegel wrote after PhS.Kai sees PhS as a work that systematically includes [`sublated']"all reasonable perspectives from all philosophers before him" and none of these philosophers used Phenomenology to teach and come to conclusions. It is like calling it as a compendium of hitherto existing perspectives.This is a strange thing to say. It amounts to denying a breakthrough in the domain of philosophy to Hegel. I mean even somebody like Charles S Pierce says that Hegel was the first modern Realist philosopher while others had been nominalists.
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== CLARIFYING PHENOMENOLOGY ==
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The subject of this talk is mainly a kind of response to Kai Forbes'write-up +/~ on G W F Hegel's
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Hegel proposed ''Geistes''/ Spirit, as Mind such as understood by Alcemeon of Creaton [500-450 B C], as I tend to allege, the ancient Greek writer on medicine, who was the first to discover the brain as the seat and power, understanding and perception in a harmonious united in mind, or, possessing the power to equalize opposites <wet/dry; hot/cold;sweet/bitter, etc.>, which he designated by the use of the original term for democracy, i.e., '''''isonomia'''''.  
`Phenomenolog/y/ie der Geistes'being the first, original title that would cover around 750 pages in all, the number of pages being equivalent to the number of copies released in April 1807 and published from Bamberg.Hegel reached there in Jan. 1807, remained preoccupied with the book-release in April, 1807.Other than  proof reading that was the most exacting exercise in early 19th c.techniks because proofing-cum-typesetting-cum-formatting constituted the last stage of publication, though handwritten pages of the author must have been made clear, edited, copy-edited, details from contents, written matter by Hegel's involvement.It was in that period that he wrote the Preface.Almost the entire book seems written straight, on the singular plane that makes writing a volitional and responsible deed, without too much, rather minimalist reworking of drafts.The thinking that lead to the book, however,covered at least five years prior to its writing.The timing of publication had to await the appearance of Napoleon during the battle of Jena.This event had to mark and impress the discovery, not recovery,of Phenomenology of Spirit as completely novel beginning the ending of via moderna.The prescencing of world-spirit completed the labours of philosophy by announcing the new born as Phenomenology as an already absolute self-consciousness. The main body comprised in the working of the way by the use of a revolutionary method of the knowledge that knows itself both in endothermic and exothermic unity.The spirit of the age as embodied by Napoleon,as the external appearance had to be recognized by Hegel for emergence of `aufheben'/sublation of all that preceded the arrival of the absolute Spirit,of man as man, at Golgotha, as that level of the brim beyond which the froth spills over.The inner, philosophical engagement and dialoguing with Christianity as religion and spending of long periods of time with Christ terminated in a Phenomenology whose contents, becoming encompassed by consciousness resulted in a Spirit/`Geist',which was absolutely adequate for Philosophy that had sublated/`aufheben' Religion.Without the appearance of the exothermic moment there would not have been a Phenomenology that would have united the diachronic and the synchronous , the latter prescencing/``darstallungen',or in the dramatic progression/procession of consciousness from experience to perception to understanding and force, then to the move in the diachronic plane self-consciousness that is the activity of knowing its truth in `desire' that exceeds the appetative desired - every `obscure object of desire'-that finds its truth in the `recognition', the terrain where desire is consummated through the dialectic of  lordship and bondage prescencing as a fight unto death between two embodiments of consciousness.The fight is a metaphor, a ruse of reason because one embodied consciousness submits to `recognizing' because the submitted consciousness knows in advance that its truth can only be constituted diachronically through work/labour/production, as unfolding by production of time, like the unrolling of a carpet, i.e.,the knowledge that the present can only become dialectical, as becoming,opposed  to the eternal, fixed knowing of the recognized consciousness, only by the effect of the future on the present since each such moment of actualization marks the road to freedom. Freedom starts in the interiority at first, but whenever the opposition exteriorizes through combats, interiority too externalizes itself as expansive, multiple units of the self. Thus the self that returns back into its indwelling site after the combat is an enriched self that can only progress concretely whenever the action of the future - the time to be made- is universal.In other words,the free self-activity of recognizing consciousness sublates/`aufheben' fixed, constant, eternal knowledge of recognized consciousness. In terms of a dialectical procession that consciousness progresses, which makes the truth of freedom as universal, a moment that cannot be grasped  by the recognized consciousness even though it learns about freedom by a limited unity with its other. The limits are the one's that it has already realized in the first two moments of individuality [ in desire]and particularity [of recognition by the other].
 
  
Hegel's `Phenomenology of Spirit/s' was made out to be a journey through a picture gallery and this gallery turns out to be a vision-in-the-making as we move from conceptualizing one picture, as mental image,to another conceptualization to yet another and in this sense Phenomenology is linked to earlier traditions their initial glimmerings may be found in Plato, especially in `Georgias' where conceptions/`ennoiai' of genera and species/ `ennoimeta' end up in thoughts/`noema'as concepts/`en-noema'. Plato introduces these themes and in the course of dialogues the difficulties of the themata emerge prominently instead of resolutions. Aristotle appealed to internal representations or fractals of Plato's `noema'as a resolution and this was contradicted by Stoical arguments on non-existent representations of thought-objects. Later Stoics used propositional and semantic logic applied to entities/`ens'.Shifted to the ontological terrain, that had already been problematized by Plato but remained suppressed through philology though in Latin the cognates of `intentio' were interpreted variously by Sextus Empiricus,Diogenes Leaterus and most prominently, Zeno of Cleanthes.`Intentio' had different meanings though as the two-fold division between mental state and mental acts clarified the terms of references.Early Arabic philosophy referred to terms such as `ma'na'and `ma'qul' mean more like `mood' of soul as it occurs in Indian philosophical term,`mana' and mental acts that had more to do with practical, `to do' of ontology instead of pure mental states , thought-objects that were self-generating and not as they were mentioned in religious scriptures. Hegel saw these excursions, except for Plato's conceptions and ma'na, as a mood of the soul, as so many pseudo philosophical inanities that had to be cleared. Hegel's task was compounded by such inanities that would block him from even getting a post in a faculty vacancy though diachronic progression developing out of French revolution, even as it appeared in its `old age' before Hegel spurred him to arrive, in the least,maybe as the owl of Minerva, at the intersection with the remains of the spirit of the age.It was at this juncture, after encountering the limit of ethical actuality in politics that Phenomenology could irrupt.Leaving the Preface aside, what Hegel wrote on the abstract ending of the notion of French revolution in Terror, or revolutionary terror as the `Feurie des Verschnwadens'is the description provided by Hegel to show the culminated act of revolution. With this act, the logic of the revolution turned into its opposite, from the dialectical logic it turned into sheer abstraction, or abstract freedom that was unmediated in the act of Terror dissolved all the earlier promises and determinations, turning the intellectual landscape into a barren desert. It is only at this point that the Spirit falls, turns into abyss, into meaninglessness and consequently,  meaningless death. The destabilization of the dialectic by abstract unmediated negativity returns us back to the ancients, especially, the problematique of cognition in relation to inadmissible ideas that Plato brings up in `Georgias' and to our own times when we ask, yet again, how can dialectic surmount the increasingly resurgent abstract, meaningless actions in the heart of world history.
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Hegel could derive speculatively that this Mind <brain> was not stuck up or submerged either in nature or reflection/representation, but has the power to raise itself in increasing degrees so as to unite the single consciousness with the real, vital feelings animating the community.Such "indwelling spirit of community", the ''prius'' of ''Geistes'' emerging as a co-relate, or consciousness that is on-and-for-itself would both subordinate and transform, ''aufhaben''/sublate by exposition of laws expressing relations of subordinate-mutual reciprocity in the commons [of life]. This would be the Spirit/''Geistes'' having suspended its subjective nature of consciousness.
  
The relevance of Hegel's Jena Phenomenology is becoming far more than what is being talked about.   
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== REVISITING HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY DER GEISTES ==
Now, Sept 2008 will mark the auction of this first edition under the auspices of HSA.The  edition may well sell in $ million+ in the hands of a fat cat. This may well be very timely but who is in a position to see the rose on the cross and dance with reconciliation?
 
  
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Question : Why should the preface cut off from the book ? What sense does it make to impute attributes to the preface when there are none ? So what if it was written in some hurry [which I doubt]in 1807, Jan.? The Preface is no configuration for what Hegel wrote later.That is also its beauty.Philosophy busies with the essential . Its content in the actual in movement that constitutes truth.Only that exists which constitutes the actuality of the self movement.What Hegel says about the truth as the Bacchic ravel where not a member is sober, because`in isolating itself from the revel each member is immediately dissolved with it'.[PhS # 47] This may not sit comfortably with the theologians.But Hegel is hardly talking about some `Greek reverie'; it is important to figure out the importance of truth, ''alethia'' in  Greek thinking.
  
Human beings do form an idea /eidos of sorts about what the work would show up after completion in relation to the initial idea, which is why there is a preconscious of the conscious, though differentiated.Unlike the beavers preconception of an embankment that actually means how much more immaculate degree of specialization than humans can ever hope to achieve,human beings are different by virtue of its dynamic and meta-dynamic spiritual universe.Transformation of preconscious to the fully developed form of consciousness is also in addition to the discovery, creating a product [eidos], or idea-product though work is a mark of general, social labour.When Hegel worked out the path to write Phenomenology, Kai is correct in tracing its genealogy to 1801-'02, the organization of that, as demanded by cumulative non-quantified logic, in 1806 did not qualify as Phenomenology to Hegel.However one should not infer that Phenomenology is something of an advance from Philosophy. There is a difference and an opposition resulting in subordination of Phenomenology to Logic or the method proper to Philosophy.I think that resemblances are and should be deceptive, fully recognized as intrinsic to aesthetics. But in Philosophy, where the right word may be `meme' [ contentious terrain for sure], yet all such acts remain subordinate to the concept [begriff].That is why reviews in newspapers too matter,when the world is yet to come out of the `Enlightenment Idea' about opinion [doxa]governing the world.In terms of dialectic Hegel broke a barrier of linearity and the work of 1807 was preceded by a leap that could only be found in the Preface where Hegel shows how and why he breaks from Descartes- the Cartesian Ego.A break that is hardly passive. It is a dialectical sublation that reverses the entire mode of the `Cogito Ego' into a past transcended, long dead or eternally passive.Spirit, according to Hegel, cannot infuse life into all the dead bones of Philosophy sunk in oblivion. Again, what does it imply for mental activity when told that the Preface to PhG could be separated from its position, then lifted and transferred for serving what succeeded - meaning what Hegel wrote up to 1817-'18 and after? 1806 cannot be separated from 1807 as long as these represent time units. When was the last time someone told you about reading any book with a Preface/ Introduction to omit the latter and read the text ? Is that something absurd or is the suggestion selectively applicable to Hegel?Dear Kai,how is it possible for you to be blinded to the sharp line of division between Philosophy and Phenomenology? Am I missing out on something altogether? Hegel was writing Philosophical Drafts in 1806, not Phenomenology.To round up what is being said, there is the difference between Hegel's perception of the product of his labours [and the use of `we' by Hegel contains others in the course of work]and the perception of social labour that produced 750 copies. If that is self-evident then the next unity must be the dynamic unity of these two modes of work and perception all the way to the moment of synthetic, non-oppositional, non-differentiated unity.That would be the work of Spirit.
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On the other hand, the analytical, neo-Kantian, `phenomenological' and positivist/empiricist thinker would also prefer to dispense with the Preface because of the manner of Hegel's break identity logic and the self-certain Ego as the I; retaining it as when "I say `I', this singular `I', I say in general all `I's'; everyone is what I say, everyone is `I' the singular" [ ''''PhS'''', 83].However, the sense of it can be felt by  radicalized souls who  see ''''PhS'''' as a book that constitutes a ‎break with previous philosophies in the same way that Heraclitus' systemic notion marked a ‎revolutionary moment in the history of philosophy.
  
‎>>>>'''Dialectic as the unfolding on musico-poetic <complex> plane underlying ‎Phenomenology of Spirit
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Jena Phenomenology was published by J Hoffmeister in Bamberg.Hegel reached there in Jan. 1807, remained preoccupied with the book-release in April, 1807.Other than  proof reading, because proofing-cum-typesetting-cum-formatting constituted the last stage of publication, final check on proofing of handwritten pages by the author must have clarified, edited, copy-edited, due to Hegel's involvement.
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I am saying the following :‎
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It was in that period,from January winters, 1807, that he wrote the Preface.Almost the entire book seems written straight, on the singular plane that makes writing a volitional and responsible deed, without too much, rather minimalist reworking of drafts.That spurt of activity imbricated Polyphony into the sounding of PhS.
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1/The question whether Phenomenologie der Geist' [PhG]is necessary for comprehending Hegel's ‎Philosophical System is a bad question, yet needs be considered since philosophy demands ‎suspension of judgment and bad questions are equally necessary for dialectic though not for the sake ‎of tarring or engagements with trivialities.   ‎
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The thinking that lead to the book, however,covered at least five years prior to its writing.The book "completed the night before the battle of Jena" and that year of Jena makes the dramatic point of intersection where the abstract freedom of French republic " passes out of its own self-destructive activity over to another land" that would be Germany.< Letter to Naithammer, Apr. 29, 1814>Jena,for Hegel was this apparent,visible passage of self-consciousness for truth awaiting `refreshment' while remaining in thought.
‎ 2/Hegel never asked anything to such effect, or resembling such a query  anytime later in his life;‎
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‎3/One response given by Hegel to a question having similar import before the second edition was ‎going for print, in 1830, evoked  mild humour, but Hegel did not say that any part, section, page, word, ‎etc. needed any change. Nothing should be changed was put across to the publishers. He was ‎emphatic in this response while he would also let others know that the times and mood at Jena of ‎‎1806-'07 was youthful;‎
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It should be kept in mind that given that there was hardly any philosopher who had identified herself with philosophy as much as Hegel.Sometimes the identification gets so personal and complete that philosophy seems like euphemism for the use of `I' by Hegel in certain contexts.
‎ 4/what I am saying is in not anything doctrinaire and nor am I interested  about the obverse side, ‎which would be the dogmatic typo;‎
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‎  5/I am saying in self-conscious terms, whose grasping and becoming is central for any knowing of Jena ‎Phenomenology, and addressing consciousness of both the un-free and the free, both as a necessity ‎as condemned by choice to be free  in a world that precludes anything under the sign of ‎scarcity/accumulation .Economy and Existence are both closely linked.‎
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The spirit of the age whether or not Napoleon,was/is political after the procession of Spirit becomes absolute self-consciousness at Golgotha, as that level of the brim beyond which the froth spills over.The inner, philosophical engagement and dialoguing with Christianity as religion and spending of long periods of time with Christ would also terminate in a Phenomenology whose contents,the becoming encompassed by consciousness resulted in a Spirit/''`Geist''',which was absolutely adequate for Philosophy that had sublated/''`aufheben''' Religion.
‎6/ Even if we were to put matters widely while the logic for studying PhG is clear and one may add ‎conventional logic for asserting that his philosophical work in 1806 having written or covered the whole ‎of PhG, as we are given to understand should be studied as well, but the `preference’ for the 1806 ‎drafts have no priority and supposing that were it to be so, this present is definitely not in the case, ‎though German speaking persons can access them on the net. It is weird to suggest with basic ‎reasonableness why should the Preface that was composed by Hegel while the book was being ‎printed be severed from the book published 1807 since both are open to reading. This question is very ‎absurd since the author himself published PhG with the Preface with no hint about any ambiguity.;‎
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‎7/any suggestion that is intended to communicate that both the versions are un-necessary sounds ‎wicked, like some ritualistic act understating chopping the head from the body, thereby expurgating ‎Hegel altogether;‎
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This needs to be restated somewhat axiomatically, on the diagonal that without the appearance of the ''in-and-for-itself'' moment  there would not have been a Phenomenology that would have united the diachronic and the synchronous, the latter prescencing [presenting itself]/`''`Darstellungen''',or in the dramatic progression/procession of consciousness from experience to perception to understanding and force.The orientation and thinking of all that appears before consciousness is posited dynamically.After exposition of the main structure of ''neoma'' < the invisibility of consciousness> consciousness moves to the diachronic plane, i.e., self-consciousness.
‎8/In terms of pragmatics and common sense, PhG is the only Phenomenology that is not just most ‎circulated, bought and sold, from rest of Hegel’s books and translated in variety of languages, Hegel's ‎Berlin Phenomenology, is another fact that is not mentioned,  ignored even by the authors with their ‎cohorts, imitators, followers and so on. This no more than pure and simple `bad faith' that is ‎symptomatic of  untruth, or a consciousness that knows its placement on the side opposed to ‎absolutes, truths, from a reading of PhG, but unwilling to recognize one’s own `unhappy ‎consciousness because that state must be lived by the self rather than emitting a state of unmindful ‎pathos that denies awareness of itself since that reveals a self consciousness. trapped in an unending ‎ladder, much like Jacob’s, where each step is a show, the illusion of climbing, so much unlike ‎Kierkegaard, whose consciousness of his own untruth itself became a truth borne out of freedom of ‎simple negation, as shown in the manner of being in the world, busy writing in cafes, using his axe to ‎break open the drawer to find his own ms’s [either/or], the very intensity of faith, and this becomes ‎polemically contrasted and opposed to; ‎
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‎9/the system of Hegel's Philosophy, which would be for Kierkegaard nothing short of a trans-historical ‎absolute all the way, since the `system’ already having `located’ him in advance, was known to him and ‎that us why he was willing to live his life as a paradox, outside any paradigm, which was asserted  ‎passionately by him in numerous books. Husserl’s, discarding of Hegel’s system was simply reactionary ‎nowhere close to Kierkegaard since the latter already knew Hegel so well that he even knew other ‎than been foreseen by Hegel’s system, that in parts Hegel’s Philosophy of Right that he took as ethics ‎based on rights was written in order to conceal Hegel’s `bad faith’.In effect, Rechtsphilosophie, ‎according to Kierkegaard was an exposition of `bad faith’, something that only he could decipher and ‎even prove by pointing the stark difference between what Hegel had to say on marriage and love and ‎the reality of Hegel’s personal situation, showing that Hegel himself led his courtship and marriage for ‎a few years with a bad conscience. Hegel refers to pangs of conscience in some letters, though that ‎level of self-consciousness would constitute proof of Hegel’s `existentialism’ for Kierkegaard.. Well ‎aware with Hegel’s thought, as if trapped in advance because of this knowing Kierkegaard would ‎oppose as indeterminacy as by his obsession with pseudonyms as though he wanted to demolish ‎proper names, like Hegel’s, his own above all, and to the anterior determination and his destiny, as ‎though the self did not exist, whereas ‎
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== CONTENTS ==
‎10/ Husserl isolates Hegel from Descartes , Kant, Fichte, not for acknowledging the knowing, as was ‎the case with Kierkegaard, of the composer of the first modern book on Phenomenology but for ‎opposite reasons, attacking Hegel as a `system builder', `unscientific', .lacking a critique of reason', said  ‎by  Husserl together with the chorus that won out from 1870’s, on Germany, after `defeating ‎metaphysics’ and `philosophy of science’ while hailing technology in ascent, in the universities and ‎faculties, under the banner of `down with metaphysics’, while accepting the subservience to major ‎growth industries by doing research on their behalf while even watered down philosophy of science ‎would get marginalized.
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Self-consciousness is the activity of knowledge of its truth after having grasped the truths of of sense-certainty, beginning the ''arche'' of desire that exceeds the appetative/appetizing object as desired,which appears in the field of perception-that finds its truth in `recognition', the terrain where desire is consummated through the dialectic of lordship and bondage prescencing with force, as a fight unto death between two embodiments of consciousness.The fight is a metaphor, a ruse of reason because one embodied consciousness submits to `recognizing' because the submitted consciousness knows in advance that its truth can only be constituted in the diachronic through work/labour/production, as unfolding by production of time.This would be dialectical becoming,opposed to the eternal knowing of the recognized consciousness,though '''only''' by the effect of the future on the present that mark out events of duration, each moment of actualization marks roads to freedom.  
≪≫<’The appendix on history of science : transition from science as based on empirical observations, ‎experiments etc, or science as earlier metaphysics begins to retreat after the defeat of 1848 revolution ‎in Germany. There is both spectacular increase in middle classes and the preponderance of ‎technology, as urban centres begin getting overhauled by water supply systems, hyginicism, radically ‎designed plumbing systems get installed as much as the drainage system begins to be transformed ‎‎,finally capping the apex of this technocratic infrastructure was electricity, and by end of 1890’s the ‎internal combustion engine hits the roads . The industrial `revolution’ that backed up such changes was ‎lead by Germany. And technology takes precedence, the applicable core of science gets accepted by ‎the burgeoning middle classes. This showed up in Germany  first, in the steel sector, with new ‎‎`techniques’<-e.m> developed for production of steel < Bessemer, Siemens, Gilchrist-Thomas> [at ‎the turn of the19th c. German steel industry was 4 times the average size of the British. This was co-‎terminus with development of new forms of credit and banking systems>. Similarly in Soda production ‎and in the whole of chemical production, the Germans became the leaders. Science was now required ‎to make new connections in fields of practical applications and no longer the sole guide to innovations. ‎In this context new theoretical physics was born < Clasius and Boltzmann’s kinetic theory, Kelvin and ‎Maxwell electromagnetism> reached unknown conclusions. Science, philosophy of nature, ‎experimentalism were getting pushed out and no longer useful in terms of everyday practicality and ‎industrial productivity.
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Here it may be instructive to mention E Mach and Avinarus as the critics of this shift. <  the criticism of ‎Mach to this mechanism, compelled  Einstein remaining grateful to Mach; their anti-mechanistic ‎critique and return to a study of pure experience, sensations…On the other hand, ‎Ostwald’s`Energetics’ tougher but a more popular conception in the scientific community, ‎reconsidered the central role of thermodynamics in its phenomenological form [equally` new’] ‎proposed an extension of the 2 laws to other forms of energy> then fragmentation of sciences….with ‎all the – environmental consequences.>‎
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Freedom starts in the interiority at first, but whenever the opposition externalizes through combats, interiority too externalizes itself as expansive, multiple units of the self. Thus the self that returns back into its indwelling site after the combat is an enriched self that can only progress concretely whenever the action of the future - the time to be made- is universal.In terms of a dialectical procession of consciousness, which makes the truth of freedom as universal, these moments cannot be grasped  by the recognized consciousness even though it learns about freedom by a limited unity with its other. The limits are the one's that it has already realized in the first two moments of individuality [ in desire]and particularity [of recognition by the other].
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Hegel's `Phenomenology of Spirit/s' was seen as a journey through a picture gallery later on by Hegel himself and this gallery turns out to be a vision-in-the-making as we move from conceptualizing one picture, as mental image,to another conceptualization to yet another and in this sense Phenomenology is linked to earlier traditions their initial clarity may be found in Plato,marking the great moment in Greek ontology where conceptions/''`ennoiai''' of genera and species/ ''''`ennoimeta''''' end up in thoughts/''`noema'''as concepts/`''''en-noema'''''. Plato introduces these themes and in the course of dialogues the difficulties of the ''themata'' emerge prominently instead of resolutions. Aristotle appealed to internal representations or fractals of Plato's ''`noema'''as a resolution, which was contradicted by Stoical arguments on non-existent representations of thought-objects.
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Later Stoics used propositional and semantic logic applied to entities/`ens' shifting to the ontological terrain, that had already been made problematical by Plato. That remained suppressed through philology though in Latin the cognates of `''intentio'' were interpreted variously by Sextus Empiricus,Diogenes Leaterus and most prominently, Zeno of Cleanthes.`''Intentio''' had different meanings though as the two-fold division between mental state and mental acts clarified the terms of references.Early Arabic philosophy referred to terms such as ''`ma'na'''and ''`ma'qul''' mean more like `mood' of soul as it occurs in Indian philosophical term,''`mana''' and mental acts that had more to do with practical, `to do' of ontology instead of pure mental states , thought-objects that were self-generating and not as they were mentioned in religious scriptures.
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== SHAPES ==
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PhS is mainly an  exposition of reason. Since self-consciousness is reason' what had been the negative relation to otherness turns out to be a positive relation' . Reason is the certainty that consciousness has of being all reality. [PhS # 232]
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[[Reason]] reaches  the most critical, spiritless and terrifying point when it assumes the shape of abstract universal freedom when all being of self is emptied into non-being.That this happens in the political sphere is consistent with critical philosophy. Subjectivity turns into something like an empty object when thought becomes so bad that ` it becomes difficult to say exactly where the badness lies.[PhS # 340]. This is what happens during French revolution when `the general will' took on the shape of abstract universality of freedom that used virtue leading to suspicion for universal terror with human heads coming under the Guillotine like `cabbages under kitchen knife'.At this point the Spirit falls,turns abyssal, into meaninglessness and consequently, meaningless death.
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The destabilization of the dialectic by abstract unmediated negativity of universal freedom would face revolt from `''observing instinct'' of self-conscious reason' in the principle of individual freedom or the opposition between universal liberty as embodied by the state and individual liberty that was the principle of liberalism.
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PhS may also be seen as transformation of preconscious to the fully developed form of consciousness is also in addition to the discovery, creating a product ''[eidos''], or idea-product though work is a mark of general, social labour, which is what makes the `we' in Hegel's philosophy..When Hegel worked out the path to write Phenomenology, Kai is correct in tracing its genealogy to 1801-'02, the organization of that, as demanded by cumulative non-quantified logic, in 1806 did not qualify as Phenomenology to Hegel.However one should not infer that Phenomenology is something of an advance from Philosophy. There is a difference and an opposition resulting in subordination of Phenomenology to Logic or the method proper to Philosophy.
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== AESTHETICS ==
  
The destiny of speculative logic was  tied to metaphysics. Branches and sub-branches derived from ‎science, or fractured science were instead inserted into math, while formalism and empiro-‎positivism spread rapidly. Now properties were deduced with math. Development of models, with ‎effective predictive powers. In new theoretical physics, Stokes completed the math. part of insertion. ‎Theory of physical optics, identifying light with waves, Maxwell broke unequivocally from the French ‎tradition by recognizing the conceptions brought to fore by Faraday and developed a electromagnetic ‎field. On this ground he derived the electromagnetic waves and electromagnetic nature of light ‎Testing them in new fields increased mans domination over nature. These opened up kinetic theory, ‎acceptance of atomic theory, a conception of thermodynamic quantities //and laws which  were ‎determined only at a phenomenological level., exemplifying the scientific practices of previous ‎decades.-//Maxwell-Boltzmann rigorously-formulated in math. terms the kinetic model of gas, where ‎they found unexpected connections – e.g. the relationship between transport co-efficients that could ‎not have been easily deduced by experiment
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Resemblances are and should be deceptive, fully recognized as intrinsic to aesthetics. But in Philosophy, where the right word may be `mime'  [ contentious terrain for sure], yet all aesthetic shapes remain subordinate in the concept [begriff], absolute self-consciousness. The work of 1807 was preceded by a leap, which was also put to words by the end of the work in the Preface where Hegel shows the destabilizing nature of truth as the ravel.  
Mechanistic models started to develop in chemistry as well.Guldberg and ‎Waage formulated the concept of chemical equilibrium [1864], similar to kinetic theory.Models ‎displaying the disposition of atoms constituting given molecules were made and ‎microscopic properties of substances were connected to such structures…start of ‎molecular engineering. The adoption of mechanical models and experimental techniques opened ‎up technological innovation and scientific advance, overturning the relationship between science and ‎technology-techne over physis or as Karen Armstrong put in her view the severance of mythos ‎and logos was complete. [ K Armstrong, Ashort history of Myth, p.113‎
 
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The scientific community was torn apart by   difficult and heated debates. Many paradoxes cropped ‎up. Pp.50-51/ In the prevailing mechanistic structure of 19th c. science and its reductionist structure as ‎well. The unification of Germany in 1871 allowed , despite the onset of long depression, the ‎development of industrialization process so rapidly and so new as to be termed `an industrial ‎revolution’ while Britain’s huge productive system remained rigid. After the civil war, similar tendency ‎began in the U S. German science took world leadership for the next 50 years, in physics chemistry, ‎math, the entire domain of scientific rsearch.USA lagged behind, approx till 1933./Firm-Industry ‎contacts established; the great technical achievement of German chemical industry were BASF’s 17 ‎year investigation  of industrial synthesis of Indigo [ costing 1,000,000 pounds] and the fixation of ‎nitrogen [ synthesis of ammonia] carried out in 1913 by BASF chemist Bosch and F Heber after 10 years ‎of research Germany could hold out for 4 years of ww1 was  this process could produce explosives and ‎fertilizers.≫≫≫‎
 
  
‎10.1/ whereas, in spite of his long painful labours Husserl failed to resolve the big intention as the ‎maker/inventor of phenomenology as a science, and for giving rise to reaction from philosophy of ‎nature who considered Husserl’s `science’ that it was nothing but an extension of 18th c. `naturalism', ‎experimental,etc. Hegelianism was made as the main culprit held responsible. It became the ‎scapegoat, for weakening the `impulse toward philosophic science , rigorous constitution by methods, ‎and created after effects for `those generation' whose belief in Hegelian philosophy actually `resulted ‎in any belief whatever in absolute philosophy’ since the absolute was over with Hegel, it gave rise to ‎‎`skeptical historicity'. Husserl stated all this right in the beginning of a lecture `Philosophy as a Rigorous ‎Science’;‎
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To round up what is being said, there is the difference between Hegel's perception of the product of his labours [and the use of `we' by Hegel contains others in the course of work]and the perception of social labour that produced 750 copies. If that is self-evident then the next unity must be the dynamic unity of these two modes of work and perception all the way to the moment of absolute synthetic as the historical dynamic, self-organizing,a self-driven progression as a net expanding historical accumulation. richer and more elevated [Jantsch on self-transcendence , Turchin on synthetic evolution and T de Chardin]. Finally, the fact that Hegel `changed' his grasp on concepts as much as widening his horizon of knowledge over the years is not in the least unexpected. Would this constitute a shift that we find in early and late Plato? I  do not think so. To get to know why that was not so PhS holds the key. Nevertheless many views, facts and ideas that he learnt or was given by others was trivial in relation to his own self-development, autocatalytic, self-sublating dialectical, to put it in a nutshell.The influence of others in Berlin was mainly exoteric. Humboldt for instance was stumped inversely, the other way around. But yes, I find Hegel' stubborn defense of Goethe in the Berlin years commendable exemplifying what it means to hold steadfast to a position regardless of what others say, the wise attitude.
‎10.2/The supreme irony that can now be stated with the benefit of hindsight, to be explicit, consisted ‎in the difference that with PhG as the presupposition Hegel went on to write true, absolute idea of ‎science in the Science of Logic that was the next presupposition of the elaboration of the Hegelian ‎system of `philosophical science', as it was elaborated in the university,‎
 
‎11/because the truths of philosophy, even as independent proposition depend upon the context ‎when the system was founded, or as stated without any paradox or indeterminacy, "Unless it is a ‎system philosophy is not a scientific production";‎
 
‎12/since the value of philosophy only made sense as a part of interdependence and/with `organic ‎whole', any an advanced state of mind, which was found in plenitude on many commons such as the ‎‎`we', `communion in the sphere of religion', `common language', etc. is in a position to see the real in ‎the unapparent, < unapparent connections are truer than apparent ones'- Heraclitus>and that is also ‎the point of access to science, its dimensions as explored  in Hegel's Phenomenology as the science of ‎both laws and unfolding of consciousness,‎
 
‎13/ in the absence of that, as the presupposition, writing the `Science of Logic' was not possible at all ‎
 
‎14/ since the sole guarantee aka certainty, exactitude was the work of uncovering all the moments of ‎Reason, which is a Section in PhG that the critics just overlook since they are neither ready to devote ‎attention and a study, a rarity, while they would readily jump to conclusions only to create confusion ‎from their confused faculty to reason or even see the Real mainly by pointing to the bare externals, as ‎obtains in the apparently arbitrary nature of the table of contents, which combines Latin and Greek ‎letters, roman-English letters, affixed double letters - AA,BB.DD, etc.- absence of numerals, ‎
 
‎15/Finally, the  content and the  thematic  in  their sequence  retain  same , like an  ordering that gets ‎simultaneously  replicated on the self-same plane;[ who would not revise anyway?]when Hegel was ‎composing the Encyclopedia; ‎
 
‎16/ e.g., in Philosophy of Mind', under the rubric Self-Consciousness, the first part under the Greek ‎alpha, Appetite corresponds to the sense-certainty of PhG, holding `desire' within, self-consciousness ‎negative under the Greek sign `beta' would correspond to PhG;s section on `Lordship and Bondage', ‎holding `recognition' within and universal self consciousness under the Greek letter epsilon does not, ‎as the moment of sublation has any identical equivalent, though it is subsumed in its meaning as ‎belonging to the sphere of Right as `self-certainty The aforementioned contents in their logical order ‎and exposing the vacuity , bad intentions of phenomenology' especially, Husserl's highly objectionable ‎point of view [ this is some line of his hallmark, close to being an usurper while loafing around inside ‎pages upon pages, as I also read what he said about Buddhist Philosophy in Gottingen, 1926], is the ‎crux of my response. The rest is meant to show historical specificity in its bare contours that I consider ‎as a counterpoint to Dilthy's `historicism'.
 
  
work-in-progress
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Latest revision as of 07:54, 28 March 2009

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Introduction

The subject of this talk started as a response to Kai Froeb's `Is the Phenomenology recommended as introduction to Hegel's System.'Few clarifications and my intent needs to be stated.My intent has been to primarily emphasize the relevance of Phenomenology of Spirit/Mind 1806/07 [ hereafter PhS]by showing some anomalies that are singular only to PhS.It also includes modifying the first chapter on Sense-Experience that made Hegel uncomfortable later. The justification,however,pertains to philosophical knowledge that is found in the opening sections of the book from the chapters sense-experience to self-consciousness. It needs be said that Kant pursued the question of justifying reason and knowledge unlike anyone, other than Plato.Kant started with sense-experience,which he saw as prior to nature, as spontaneously `free without cause'. This fitted well with Enlightenment's empiricist, reductive/deductive, sensationalist, physicalist epistemic boundary in Kant's endeavor to find among the least or the lowest a confirmation of Enlightenment sensibility.Kant saw the world of things with its co-relate individualistic atomism as a state about which we cannot know anything.To him experience was limited by abstract understanding where he stopped.The world of thing hood, said Kant is the nominal of which nothing could be known. We could, at best believe in them but that is not knowledge. Consequently, by limiting or cutting knowledge down Kant made room for faith.Even in matters of faith the question of God's existence was undecidable.Hegel observed that for Kant things were externally related by understanding before its disappearance into nothing. For consciousness , this was made into an illustration for pointing towards Kant's limit in various modes of expressiveness though formal-abstract relations had an absolute limit for the dialectical unfolding of consciousness similar in terms for producing sensitivity that irrupts when Hegel would show a clear progression from quantity [external relations] to quality. As for the manifold of external relations,they were doomed to pass away.To Kant, thing hood is a finite moment proceeding with non-things and this latter negative conditioned the first moment of vanishing. God, on the other hand was non-finite in the advanced level of concept-existence. Hegel said of Kant that `knowledge has reached a conclusion that it knows nothing.

Let me hasten to add that if the issue at hand pertains to people who read PhS as Hegel's main work, the `real thing' without proceeding any further in the direction of post-Jena works then the worthies are chasing a chimera. Besides, to approach PhS directly without ever reading early Hegel, if not direct then at least through Lukas,Dilthy or H S Harris' work, is a disastrous start.Again if a perception informs that the reception of PhS is unusually overwhelming at the expanse of Science of Logic and Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences among Anglo-Saxon and French readers then Kai's corrective makes good deal of sense. This is difficult to believe about the Francophone world, who may otherwise be disinclined towards Hegel and Hegel studies, in a way understandable instead of waiving PhS above all.

Yet it is also conceivable that within the tendency or/and discipline of phenomenological research, which has a long tradition in French inquiry, PhS may have emerged with some show.In that case we are not really talking about Hegel.It is somewhat pathetic to see the French `intellectual tradition' persisting with disregard or indifference towards their own enthusiastic reception of Hegel in his lifetime [V Cousins], Claude Bernard's lucid , brief exposition about Hegel,some of Ludwig Michelet's unsurpassed commentaries, somebody who was faithful to the meaning in Hegel's systematic philosophy Vera's expositions/commentaries on Hegel, de Velliers metaphysical grasp and many from the ranks of the truly best,kindred traditions of 19h c. French culture. In the 20th c. that long 19th c. tradition came under a vicious attack from positivism, which was sealed by ww1.I would not make a similar argument about the traditions of the Anglo-Saxon world though what maybe seen as somewhat alarming is a surfacing and growing super-ego type dismissing of Hegel. Neither does it have that bit of wit and wisdom to sustain the barbs and the none too subtle homologous `consensus based' post modern's dressed up invectives on Hegel.Again, the significance of of parallel tendencies too must be active but that life has been truly miserable, unhappy [consciousness]. Well case of idiosyncrasy on the nationalist side for quiet a few, to have seen the `chief Hegelian' of 20th c. in the person of A Kojeve.

While the `meaning of Geistes in German as equally Spirit and Mind is an example of the anomalous there seems as a bias, not German though from the side of Hegel scholarship in Germany. This comes up unexpectedly in Kai's preference, not his motive. I remember reading one article of his on Hegelianism in Germany which makes it clear that institutionally Germany is way ahead in Hegel studies,iterative publications like Yearbooks and archival resources in a comparative sense.Though that alone need not show up in either the quality of books, articles and the sort of sweep and wisdom for judgment of a magisterial kind, what it does is indicating uneven and skewed distribution of resources on Hegel. It is far easier to those knowing good German to access a good deal of Hegel's than it would be in the Anglo-Saxon world.Even Hegel's `Differenz' essay on Schelling and Fichte cannot be easily accessed in English. Sure this would not bother most University based Hegel scholars and `specialists' but when it comes to the bigger intermediate level these things matter.Other than that, sensitivity towards translated versions in any single language, say Italian or Japanese seems amiss and the reason for that has little to do with authenticity, chanted by purists. It may have more to do with the ring of`philological fetishism' around `the written stuff'.The demand for so-called `exactitude' , accuracy or reading the original German version is quiet unlike the spirit of Hegel who was not only not a purist Cartesian in matters of linguistic composition. He considered philology as soft corpus of science.


After scribbling palimpsest jotting primitives to approximate the opening chapter of Hegel's Phenomenology,it became clear that starting with pure immediacy as indicated by `this', `what',`that', not-this, not what',`not-that' means a simple twofold ~ being is as non-being is.The cardinal importance of Hegel's Jena Phenomenology is in pushing the justification of all philosophy beyond abstract experience of understanding.Mind/Spirit experiences immediacy and pushes beyond the limits of understanding towards theoretical reason. `This' can only be if `non-this' and `not-this' if be `this'.In language, to say `this is' would already grant a movement to the `is' as something more or less of `that'.Phenomenology would have no other justification other than other than beginning with experiencing.

There are no suppositions,axioms to prove `this'and not-this. That you have eyes to see white that is enough. Here the presupposition is also as posited.The road up and down are the same. The same is posited in the up and down What is posited is a simple movement.The beginning and end is the same . The same is the unity as becoming.The thing, in that it is,is not and in that it is not, is.Inquiry into the self or when self looks within consciousness finds the interposition/-change of the two in the unity , becoming.This is the truth that comes from inwardness or inquiry into self. However, being is only a determinate abstract as becoming shows up as simple unity.As equal abstractions both find no further unfolding in the absence of concept. This is when reason, nous, irrupts like a contingency/accident in the self. Reason takes the abstract unity of becoming by negating the abstract and unfolds as the negative unity.This is the next elevation from becoming.Self conscious reason experiences the truth in the becoming/same.Reason is common to all even when most humans prove uncomprehending because they make as if they had an understanding of their own.But thinking is common to all and inquiry into oneself shows this thinking beyond understanding as reason as the unity of self-consciousness. Reason grasps that nothing as the concept that makes `this' of the sense as a determinate `this' by keeping the truth of becoming of perception.

But the level of perception can only have the truth by removing the immediacy of senses. Perception preserves sense-experience by annulling its immediacy without annihilating it.The term `sublate' means to preserve/keep the predecessor by ceasing its immediacy so what is kept is negative, as mediation.In perception, empirical consciousness remains sublated. Even when it is radicalized, empirical consciousness in the discrete, heterogeneous scale is operative and limited to understanding. Theoretical reason goes beyond empirical understanding, under the terms of rational consciousness.

The `dialectic of sense-certainty' like natural consciousness is the `simple history of its movement.[ Ref. Pinkard, Terry, Phenomenology of Mind', Zusatz,109, put in single quotes] What is learnt from experience is easily forgotten and erroneous sequences repeat themselves. Through the medium of consciousness, reason makes the simple abstraction that in this truth of experience lies the truth all of experiences.Yet the very vastness of experience coming and ceasing in the abyss of duration cannot be enveloped by perception and reason.Like the first contact that initiates by opening a dimension that is invisible, reason steps in not to designate the invisible as absolute but establish the level of perception that sustains the visible of sense experience.Invisible inheres in the world to sustain the visible.


The reception of being passes by the action of thinking into the phenomenal world. The plenitude of being is external for all.

The determinate nothing remains an active nothing after the `double sublation' of becoming and abstract understanding. It is as though one expects the unexpected ; there is no unexpected sans expecting for there is no known passage to access it. Speculation is the movement of reason needed to get to the unexpected or unknown. This is where conditions for dialectical movement shows up clearly for consciousness as it reflects in relation to itself and registers a transformation of movement into dialectical self-unfolding.

What is said as of relates to a mode of sublation externalizing what gets preserved open to influences and that which was caused to cease or ended would be the neomatic curvature resembling a non-linear "movement of returning back to itself, reflection into self or a self-relation of inner time-dialectic. By now the break with Kant's aporias, antinomies is crystal clear.He saw the `act of experience' as free act, `prior to natural cause' in the observations on the `third antinomy' [Critique of Pure Reason, Miklejohn tr., p. 2375 ff]

Phenomenology may not easily find a place in university `reading lists' nor can it be thrust upon someone since it is not an easy book to teach from the lectern or pulpit.Nor was the book really written exclusively for universities since it addressed the wider concerns of Bildung..This figures in Hegels Philosophical Propadeutic [1808-11] to be taught in the middle class/form/section in school `The subject of mind/spirit is phenomenal when essentially relating to an existing object, insofar as it is consciousness.' Mind which is spontaneously active within itself as self-referential gets a step higher, for the next, highest level, as Psychology.

PHENOMENOLOGY AS INTERNAL TO HEGEL'S OEUVRE

PhS is is like a stepping stone for introduction to Hegel's systematic philosophy for reasons such as : a]suitable for middle level education equivalent to `civil society' that is prior to the next level, Logic/Encyclopedia; b] it is a lively exposition pulsating with the dialectic as a method of movement and as an organizing principle of scientific exposition;c]almost all the concepts of Hegel's system prefigure with considerable clarity in PhS; d] teaches critical method in the movement from one field to the next with precision and economy of thought;e] prefiguring almost all the subjects of Hegel's systemic philosophy in terms of the notion/concept as unfolding;f]data structures from history bereft of their individuality and shown to belong to the movement of self-consciousness as the truth of historical `facts', which opens up another dimension of historical inquiry into the presupposed res gestae or the subdued voice in silence;g]as a book standing on its own not for reasons of any `system' but in the anti-systemic sense.


Hegel could read like those gifted by nature, and freed from innocence and guilt.The two main concerns of Hegel in his lifetime were religion/church and state/despotism. During his youth Hegel was openly talking about the church that practices the despotism of the state. Following from this concern, Hegel's legacy was immediately political.PhS can be read as political critique of modern theology. `What in religion was content, as the form of representing the other is self's own activity.[PhS # 797]

The philosophy of his age arose from the need that conditions of civil society produced estrangement, oppositions and prevalent antagonisms.Instead of a possession qualified subjectively, consciousness for Hegel is the restless indwelling spirit in terms of individuality and as the indwelling spirit of community throbbing with life and inconceivable as standing apart from the `sociality of reason'.

This response is sensitive to historical contexts, durations and time especially when the subject is Hegel, whose life mysteriously co-coincided with historical drifts.

In the language of PhS it is thinking that speaks to itself and equally listens, which arranges density, clears confusions in the manner of the incipient language of early Greek philosophy, rich in phonetic attributes.Hegel used native dialects and vernacular traditions that may be seem unrefined and uncouth grammatically.Yet great moments of spirit's journey may be lying precisely in those regions.Urges and instinct are more than ambivalent when they end up saying `yes' and `no' at the same time.These paradoxicals come on their own through the medium of instincts and Hegel, it seems, hardly reversed his `urges' though they were kept as negative moments of dialectic.

I know this may sound trite but not without its worth to state the only other book that Hegel wrote was Science of Logic. The influence of PhS over Science of Logic could only be seen as refractive and/or ethereal. Science of Logic has PhS as its presupposition but in its own movement,the moments stand opposed to sensuous, figurative and opposing consciousness [ subject-object to subject-subject relations]is presupposed in Science of Logic.The method of Philosophy consists in its being freed from oppositions of consciousness showing up in the phenomenal worlds, which is quiet different from `freeing the mind from misconceptions'.

The metaphor `ladder' can be thrown away after climbing the last step, as suggested by Wittgenstein. Here, Kai does not provide the consequential logic of the `ladder'; should it be kept, internalized or thrown away, externalized or what? The formulation also begets answer to the question why didn't Hegel extend whatever he did write his earlier piece titled Philosophie der Geistes' to the Phenomenology?


Kai's argument is that PhS was hurriedly written by Hegel whereas in the earlier writings, the subjects - logic, nature,spirit/mind/history/aesthetics - make a better template for reading all that Hegel wrote after PhS.Kai sees PhS as a work that systematically includes [`sublated']"all reasonable perspectives from all philosophers before him" and none of these philosophers used Phenomenology to teach and come to conclusions. It is like calling it as a compendium of hitherto existing perspectives.This is a strange thing to say. It amounts to denying a breakthrough in the domain of philosophy to Hegel. I mean even somebody like Charles S Pierce says that Hegel was the first modern Realist philosopher while others had been nominalists.

CLARIFYING PHENOMENOLOGY

Hegel proposed Geistes/ Spirit, as Mind such as understood by Alcemeon of Creaton [500-450 B C], as I tend to allege, the ancient Greek writer on medicine, who was the first to discover the brain as the seat and power, understanding and perception in a harmonious united in mind, or, possessing the power to equalize opposites <wet/dry; hot/cold;sweet/bitter, etc.>, which he designated by the use of the original term for democracy, i.e., isonomia.

Hegel could derive speculatively that this Mind <brain> was not stuck up or submerged either in nature or reflection/representation, but has the power to raise itself in increasing degrees so as to unite the single consciousness with the real, vital feelings animating the community.Such "indwelling spirit of community", the prius of Geistes emerging as a co-relate, or consciousness that is on-and-for-itself would both subordinate and transform, aufhaben/sublate by exposition of laws expressing relations of subordinate-mutual reciprocity in the commons [of life]. This would be the Spirit/Geistes having suspended its subjective nature of consciousness.

REVISITING HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY DER GEISTES

Question : Why should the preface cut off from the book ? What sense does it make to impute attributes to the preface when there are none ? So what if it was written in some hurry [which I doubt]in 1807, Jan.? The Preface is no configuration for what Hegel wrote later.That is also its beauty.Philosophy busies with the essential . Its content in the actual in movement that constitutes truth.Only that exists which constitutes the actuality of the self movement.What Hegel says about the truth as the Bacchic ravel where not a member is sober, because`in isolating itself from the revel each member is immediately dissolved with it'.[PhS # 47] This may not sit comfortably with the theologians.But Hegel is hardly talking about some `Greek reverie'; it is important to figure out the importance of truth, alethia in Greek thinking.

On the other hand, the analytical, neo-Kantian, `phenomenological' and positivist/empiricist thinker would also prefer to dispense with the Preface because of the manner of Hegel's break identity logic and the self-certain Ego as the I; retaining it as when "I say `I', this singular `I', I say in general all `I's'; everyone is what I say, everyone is `I' the singular" [ 'PhS', 83].However, the sense of it can be felt by radicalized souls who see 'PhS' as a book that constitutes a ‎break with previous philosophies in the same way that Heraclitus' systemic notion marked a ‎revolutionary moment in the history of philosophy.

Jena Phenomenology was published by J Hoffmeister in Bamberg.Hegel reached there in Jan. 1807, remained preoccupied with the book-release in April, 1807.Other than proof reading, because proofing-cum-typesetting-cum-formatting constituted the last stage of publication, final check on proofing of handwritten pages by the author must have clarified, edited, copy-edited, due to Hegel's involvement.

It was in that period,from January winters, 1807, that he wrote the Preface.Almost the entire book seems written straight, on the singular plane that makes writing a volitional and responsible deed, without too much, rather minimalist reworking of drafts.That spurt of activity imbricated Polyphony into the sounding of PhS.

The thinking that lead to the book, however,covered at least five years prior to its writing.The book "completed the night before the battle of Jena" and that year of Jena makes the dramatic point of intersection where the abstract freedom of French republic " passes out of its own self-destructive activity over to another land" that would be Germany.< Letter to Naithammer, Apr. 29, 1814>Jena,for Hegel was this apparent,visible passage of self-consciousness for truth awaiting `refreshment' while remaining in thought.

It should be kept in mind that given that there was hardly any philosopher who had identified herself with philosophy as much as Hegel.Sometimes the identification gets so personal and complete that philosophy seems like euphemism for the use of `I' by Hegel in certain contexts.

The spirit of the age whether or not Napoleon,was/is political after the procession of Spirit becomes absolute self-consciousness at Golgotha, as that level of the brim beyond which the froth spills over.The inner, philosophical engagement and dialoguing with Christianity as religion and spending of long periods of time with Christ would also terminate in a Phenomenology whose contents,the becoming encompassed by consciousness resulted in a Spirit/`Geist,which was absolutely adequate for Philosophy that had sublated/`aufheben Religion.

This needs to be restated somewhat axiomatically, on the diagonal that without the appearance of the in-and-for-itself moment there would not have been a Phenomenology that would have united the diachronic and the synchronous, the latter prescencing [presenting itself]/``Darstellungen',or in the dramatic progression/procession of consciousness from experience to perception to understanding and force.The orientation and thinking of all that appears before consciousness is posited dynamically.After exposition of the main structure of neoma < the invisibility of consciousness> consciousness moves to the diachronic plane, i.e., self-consciousness.

CONTENTS

Self-consciousness is the activity of knowledge of its truth after having grasped the truths of of sense-certainty, beginning the arche of desire that exceeds the appetative/appetizing object as desired,which appears in the field of perception-that finds its truth in `recognition', the terrain where desire is consummated through the dialectic of lordship and bondage prescencing with force, as a fight unto death between two embodiments of consciousness.The fight is a metaphor, a ruse of reason because one embodied consciousness submits to `recognizing' because the submitted consciousness knows in advance that its truth can only be constituted in the diachronic through work/labour/production, as unfolding by production of time.This would be dialectical becoming,opposed to the eternal knowing of the recognized consciousness,though only by the effect of the future on the present that mark out events of duration, each moment of actualization marks roads to freedom.

Freedom starts in the interiority at first, but whenever the opposition externalizes through combats, interiority too externalizes itself as expansive, multiple units of the self. Thus the self that returns back into its indwelling site after the combat is an enriched self that can only progress concretely whenever the action of the future - the time to be made- is universal.In terms of a dialectical procession of consciousness, which makes the truth of freedom as universal, these moments cannot be grasped by the recognized consciousness even though it learns about freedom by a limited unity with its other. The limits are the one's that it has already realized in the first two moments of individuality [ in desire]and particularity [of recognition by the other].

Hegel's `Phenomenology of Spirit/s' was seen as a journey through a picture gallery later on by Hegel himself and this gallery turns out to be a vision-in-the-making as we move from conceptualizing one picture, as mental image,to another conceptualization to yet another and in this sense Phenomenology is linked to earlier traditions their initial clarity may be found in Plato,marking the great moment in Greek ontology where conceptions/`ennoiai of genera and species/ ''`ennoimeta end up in thoughts/`noemaas concepts/`'en-noema. Plato introduces these themes and in the course of dialogues the difficulties of the themata emerge prominently instead of resolutions. Aristotle appealed to internal representations or fractals of Plato's `noemaas a resolution, which was contradicted by Stoical arguments on non-existent representations of thought-objects.


Later Stoics used propositional and semantic logic applied to entities/`ens' shifting to the ontological terrain, that had already been made problematical by Plato. That remained suppressed through philology though in Latin the cognates of `intentio were interpreted variously by Sextus Empiricus,Diogenes Leaterus and most prominently, Zeno of Cleanthes.`Intentio had different meanings though as the two-fold division between mental state and mental acts clarified the terms of references.Early Arabic philosophy referred to terms such as `ma'naand `ma'qul mean more like `mood' of soul as it occurs in Indian philosophical term,`mana and mental acts that had more to do with practical, `to do' of ontology instead of pure mental states , thought-objects that were self-generating and not as they were mentioned in religious scriptures.

SHAPES

PhS is mainly an exposition of reason. Since self-consciousness is reason' what had been the negative relation to otherness turns out to be a positive relation' . Reason is the certainty that consciousness has of being all reality. [PhS # 232]

Reason reaches the most critical, spiritless and terrifying point when it assumes the shape of abstract universal freedom when all being of self is emptied into non-being.That this happens in the political sphere is consistent with critical philosophy. Subjectivity turns into something like an empty object when thought becomes so bad that ` it becomes difficult to say exactly where the badness lies.[PhS # 340]. This is what happens during French revolution when `the general will' took on the shape of abstract universality of freedom that used virtue leading to suspicion for universal terror with human heads coming under the Guillotine like `cabbages under kitchen knife'.At this point the Spirit falls,turns abyssal, into meaninglessness and consequently, meaningless death.

The destabilization of the dialectic by abstract unmediated negativity of universal freedom would face revolt from `observing instinct of self-conscious reason' in the principle of individual freedom or the opposition between universal liberty as embodied by the state and individual liberty that was the principle of liberalism.


PhS may also be seen as transformation of preconscious to the fully developed form of consciousness is also in addition to the discovery, creating a product [eidos], or idea-product though work is a mark of general, social labour, which is what makes the `we' in Hegel's philosophy..When Hegel worked out the path to write Phenomenology, Kai is correct in tracing its genealogy to 1801-'02, the organization of that, as demanded by cumulative non-quantified logic, in 1806 did not qualify as Phenomenology to Hegel.However one should not infer that Phenomenology is something of an advance from Philosophy. There is a difference and an opposition resulting in subordination of Phenomenology to Logic or the method proper to Philosophy.

AESTHETICS

Resemblances are and should be deceptive, fully recognized as intrinsic to aesthetics. But in Philosophy, where the right word may be `mime' [ contentious terrain for sure], yet all aesthetic shapes remain subordinate in the concept [begriff], absolute self-consciousness. The work of 1807 was preceded by a leap, which was also put to words by the end of the work in the Preface where Hegel shows the destabilizing nature of truth as the ravel.

To round up what is being said, there is the difference between Hegel's perception of the product of his labours [and the use of `we' by Hegel contains others in the course of work]and the perception of social labour that produced 750 copies. If that is self-evident then the next unity must be the dynamic unity of these two modes of work and perception all the way to the moment of absolute synthetic as the historical dynamic, self-organizing,a self-driven progression as a net expanding historical accumulation. richer and more elevated [Jantsch on self-transcendence , Turchin on synthetic evolution and T de Chardin]. Finally, the fact that Hegel `changed' his grasp on concepts as much as widening his horizon of knowledge over the years is not in the least unexpected. Would this constitute a shift that we find in early and late Plato? I do not think so. To get to know why that was not so PhS holds the key. Nevertheless many views, facts and ideas that he learnt or was given by others was trivial in relation to his own self-development, autocatalytic, self-sublating dialectical, to put it in a nutshell.The influence of others in Berlin was mainly exoteric. Humboldt for instance was stumped inversely, the other way around. But yes, I find Hegel' stubborn defense of Goethe in the Berlin years commendable exemplifying what it means to hold steadfast to a position regardless of what others say, the wise attitude.