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== Introduction ==
 
== Introduction ==
The subject of this talk started as a response to [[User:Kai|Kai Froeb]]'s written piece - [[Is the Phenomenology needed or recommended as introduction to Hegel's System]] - but after a few edits and readings on G W F Hegel's ''Phenomenolog/y/ie der Geistes'''<PdG/PhG hereafter>,it became clear that the scope of response would be narrow and somewhat self-serving if I did not follow it up by providing few arguments to build a case that Hegel's Phenomenology, despite having the pure immediacy of the `this', `what', not-this, not what',appearances that immediately relate to sense-experience should not be mistaken as a `first philosophy'.Denying any possibility for first philosophy is what the `Preface' is all about. Sense-experience is explored since only as a simple immediacy, without presuppositions considering the oppositions of the most elementary kind - sleep/awakening; soul/consciousness;this/not this; what/not what - can only be posited in the immediacy marked by the here and now.This is the basic time-line for making a beginning with simple sequences of oppositions, which have their mark in facts. In the experience of senses the negative is not mediated - the not-this of this is the result of moving a look from one place to another or the `what' that becomes so by tactile sense only needs the absence of touch to become non-what. The opposition that begins with waking from sleep is first organized by one-sided acts of the soul that organizes the totality of senses that further gets negated by the consciousness that is set to motion by the simulation and excitation of the senses on Mind. The truths of sense-certainty are empirical; they are facts of consciousness.  
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The subject of this talk started as a response to [[User:Kai|Kai Froeb]]'s `Is the Phenomenology needed or recommended as introduction to Hegel's System.'After scribbling palimpsest jotting primitives to approximate the opening chapter of Hegel's Phenomenology,[PhS, hereafter] it was clear that starting with pure immediacy as indicated by `this', `what',`that', not-this, not what',`not-that' were all simply abstract in a twofold character. The moment this' is uttered about any smell or sound it is as immediate for senses as the passage to `not-this' as that moves away sooner than a blink by another  immediacy.This is like the flow of time.In language, to say `this is' would already grant a movement to the `is'as something more or less of `that'.  
  
The activity of reason does not negate the facts but uses it as the material for the formation of the shapes of the truth of sense-certainty,the initial abstraction as the `dialectic of sense-certainty' like natural consciousness is the `simple history of its movement, the time-line ending up in the movement of the sequence.[ Ref. Pinkard, Terry, Phenomenology of Mind', Zusatz,109, put in single quotes] What is learnt from experience is easily forgotten only for the same sequence to repeat itself. The truth sublates the first sublation, i.e., of sense-certainty, is experienced as a universal. Through the medium of consciousness, reason makes the simple abstraction that in this truth of experience lies the truth of all of experience as universal.We begin with the argument that seeks agreement on the empirical presence of nothing as experienced by sense-experience as the `truth about sensuous things.'[p.49]
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There are no suppositions, like axioms or knowledge required at all to say `this'. For reason the being that is `this' is as simple an abstraction as its nothing,`not-this'.There is no relation between them. Each this is equally non-this, which makes a unity;the fluidity in the immediate passage of the not-this to the this is an equal unity.None are true even as facts for they are not separate things.Saying that `nothing is' is ridiculous for senses but that is not so for reason.Reason grasps that nothing is that escapes senses. What is true can only be for reason and that takes effort by reason to raise these simple unities to a level when the flux can be perceived. Hegel's phenomenology is not any `first philosophy'. As a first, the truth of sense is untrue. Only when its unities are raised to a higher region do we arrive at the truth of self-certainty. But the level of perception can only have the truth by removing the immediacy of senses. Perception preserves sense-experience by annulling its immediacy without annihilating it.The term `sublate' means to preserve/keep the predecessor as a negative, as mediation.
  
The beginning of PdG is the nothing that is the result of the way the phenomenal world is received. It is the simple negative that is celebrated by the whole of nature.It is not the difference or the opposition of being and non-being.It is the truth that predated the development of human species and human has this nothingness is the moment of eternal repetition. Only in perception does the nothing transits to something determinate since now the reception passes by the action of negative at the phenomenal level, but as a kind of verification of it in the form of appearance. The plenitude  of sense-certain world becomes first the distinction and the mediation by negative now becomes essence as separateness of phenomenon,  the determinate nothing is posited as appearance,as `doubled sublation', conceptualized as an abstraction, which too is the universal medium in which `thinghood' stays. Now, the essence is posited in consciousness as `contradictory'.As conscious reflects,it finds the movement turning to development, e.g., the singular unity of things are now a multiplicity and diversity. The `also' is sublated by essence that is apprehended in pure or single thought.
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Sense-experience is explored as  simple immediacy. These get negated by the consciousness, which is in motion due to the simulation and excitation of the senses on Mind. The truths of sense-certainty are posited empirically; they are facts of consciousness. What is, is not and what is not, is.
  
What is said in the first two sections of PhG is basically are the two truths, as nothing and essence implicates thing-hood as the what and not what. Hearing and seeing fades away in the truth of sense-experience while the essence of mediating/sublating ends up in positing the thought. All these are dialectical movement of development., where the abstraction makes the universal indeterminate.The activity of essence, however, turns things indifferent to `things-for-themselves.
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The `dialectic of sense-certainty' like natural consciousness is the `simple history of its movement.[ Ref. Pinkard, Terry, Phenomenology of Mind', Zusatz,109, put in single quotes] What is learnt from experience is easily forgotten and erroneous sequences repeat themselves. Through the medium of consciousness, reason makes the simple abstraction that in this truth of experience lies the truth all of experiences.Yet the very vastness of experience coming and ceasing in the abyss of duration cannot be enveloped by perception and reason.Like the first contact that initiates by opening a dimension this is invisible, that is when reason steps in not to designate the invisible as absolute as to establish the level of perception that sustains the visible of sense experience. For consciousness there opens up the dimension of interiority as the condition for sustaining the ground of possibility including contingency.We begin by opposing the argument that seeks agreement on the empirical presence of nothing can be experienced by sense-experience for establishing the truth about sensuous things.
  
Other than stating the barest, to split the argumetation, not sufficient justice has been given to PhG.But Hegel could have elaborated further, that is done elsewhere,however, the dense complexity in arguing for the simple and clear. The complexity of this semi-system does not give much credence to much takingthat says talk as some text that is in a position to be an introduction to Hegel's System.That  is also why Hegel wrote another Phenomenology  in Berlin, being a part of the Encyclopedia. What needs emphasis and exposition is the relatively higher acceptance < because of the insights and originality> of Jena phenomenology. I can start off with qualified `truths' in a architectonic of elevation from one level to the next. That would also explain why Kai can begin straight with a high order question.
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Even animals are aware of the `mystery of bread and wine' as the simple negative that is celebrated by the whole of nature.It is not the difference or the opposition of being and non-being. Only in perception is nothing the condition for any determinate.Now the reception of being passes the the action of negative into the phenomenal world. The plenitude  of being in world resulting from  original mediation leads to the self relation of negative by splitting/saundering to retreat/withdraw into interiority  as the essence of separate and manifold phenomenon.The determinate nothing is inverted appearance,showing like `doubled sublation', as unknown. It is conceptualized as an abstraction, which again is the medium for `thinghood'. The essence, as self-alienating is posited in consciousness as `contradictory'.However, conditions for dialectic shows up in the clearing as consciousness reflects on it to register a transformation of movement to development, e.g., the singular unity of things are now a multiplicity and diversity.  
  
The debate is centred around the question. Basically I am asking whether it is question in the sense of its import simply because the question not only relates to any addressee who has decided like the decision any student or a cobbler or a professor , which externalizes by uttering the question whose consequences are infinite which may seem to exceed Hegel's absolutes of his system of philosophical sciences.It's like Atlas asking for a lever so that he can move the planet by himself.The one's who ask this question can be limited to graduate students besides few sincere ignoramuses. In the realm of philosophy the question is thoughtlessly naive.But philosophy is not dismissive of any naivete that effectuates a response resembling the simple negative.To even search for a introduction to any system, per see elicits a standard response which displaces the question insofar any answer is given in a way close to Kant turning away from his own efforts that result in the discovery of the main principle of philosophy that is speculative. By opposing the consequences and results from the  speculative principle that would end up in the manifold of appearance, Kant splits his own profound finding since the R/reason that makes the activity of mediating the very principle of philosophy in the Real manifold of appearances, what Kant sees in the consciousness which gives shape to reason out of the materials available in specific times  as the unknown and unknowable. Instead of pushing the activity of Reason out of consciousness in the world of appearance, the `objective' world that is identical with the subject to begin with in Fichte's system , which at ay rate would have produced a phenomenology, Kant is seen by Hegel as `betraying' the principles that makes philosophy possible by surrendering Reason to Understanding, transforming the infinite meditations of consciousness that is active in the real world  which shows itself as such, Kant makes the manifold world of unfolding appearances, which may have been mediated by the derived essence of speculative philosophy, Kant turns the the unfolding of essence in shapes of appearances into an abstraction or makes abstraction as something like a potentially huge generalization.An abstraction of this order of magnitude provides the illusion of being reason, which makes reason as something finite.The opposition to phenomena to nouema that Kant makes central, since eventhe structure of nouemata is hardly an advance from Aristotle whereas the veil of mystical < secret kind of knowing> after reaching the limits of understanding, which is taken or borrowed from Hume's empiricism, Kant begins to talk about the fallibility , defect, lack, deficiency of human cognition, activity of thinking. But the demands of infinity that lingers from the original moment when the principle got formulated is now transformed and justified as a priori and further as the unity of aperception in the a priori. Turning to the side of subject, subjectivity, etc, Kant makes that to be the active side that wills, aims towards actualizing the ends of moral-ethical order like the ceaseless activity of what he calls `ought'. Yet there emerges once again the inability, activity that has within itself some shortcoming or defect which becomes like a wall or a barrier to be identical with the end.Here Kant takes up the concept of unity, as a high form of ethical idea that is at the same time unable by insurmountable barriers that the subject imposes upon itself, which has the capacity to apprehend the said limits or defects expounded by Kant.Instead of the  ought that is also an out-and-out positivity , Kant factors the transcendental as the basic property any subject's consciousness. In a self-alienated, estranged and sundered world whose reflection's are Kantian antimony, Hegel credits Fichte for remaining or holding truly to the speculative principle by keeping the the subject-object identity right till the end though the initial I=I type identity was used with enthusiasm, towards the closing part of his system the said principle gets stressed and strained after Fichte return to Kant for taking up the ought as providing proof for his identity logic in a one sided manner that forgets the simple opposite of any `ought', namely while it is possible for ought to reach as close as possible to the sublime `world', it is equally true for the ought that fails to come anywhere close to the said proximal.Thus the ought contains a strong , irreconcilable opposition within itself, which Fichte attempts to resolve by making the object as conditioned by the subject through relations though the conditioning  of the object does not eliminate the autonomous self-identity of the object. Fichte terms the conditioning as a necessity that makes the object as a subjective object.The enunciation of self-identity by Fichte shows something regressive from 1801 to 1811-12.In Science of Logic, Hegel would come down upon Fichte very critically.Especially after hearing Schilling's critique of the `subjective object' as non-existent in the system of the unity of nature and spirit..
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What is said in the first two sections of PhS is a mode of sublation externalizing what gets preserved open to external influences and that which was caused to cease or ended would be the neomatic curvature resembling non-linear "''movement'' of returning back to itself, reflection into self or a self-relation of inner time-dialectic. By now the break with Kant's aporias, antinomies is crystal clear.
  
Hegel was an astute reader, extraordinarily gifted by nature that freed him from  innocence and misunderstanding.This  side comes out clearly in the 1801 essay on the `Differanz' where one also gets to read and learn a modesty specific to philosophy even when the critical side remains as the sublated moment wen Hegel takes up Reinhold.The all-too-human modesty of Hegel has often been interpreted as his conservative side that weighed heavier than the revolutionary side of dialectic by Engels. The two main concerns of Hegel in his lifetime was religion/church and state/despotism. During his youth Hegel was openly talking about the church that practices the despotism of the state and by the close of his lifetime, the interactivity between these two oppressive institutions wee such that Germany was stuck up in a morass of semi-feudalism. Following from this concern, Hegel's legacy was immediately political after the initial theological spurt. Which is the reason why , if at all any book should be advised for somebody keen to get introduced to Hegel's philosophy would benefit by gaining insights about the real problems confronting philosophy of the times with reading his `Philosophy of Right'or even his last of political observations and essays on the British Reform Bill of 1832-33 [ tr. Knox], that being a cause championed by Hegel  much more than offering a mixed up philosophical receptacle culled from the diversity of his thought as it comes out in the Encyclopedia whee the metaphor of a ladder can be conjured up in order, from one step to the next or by making either PhG or WL as though they were the scaffolding of what is strangely accepted as the absolute `body' of Hegel's `system' with little leads or cues about how it tuns out to be his magnum opus. Writing is prius to speech and in that tradition what Hegel wrote are perhaps closest to authenticate his cognition, method and orientation while also more difficult to grasp as fast as his transcribed lecture notes.
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At any rate, going by the history of acceptance of Hegel's texts/books, Jena Phenomenology has possibly been accepted and even read much more than any other text/transcriptions/books at least in the previous century. Only the Philosophy of Right carries the possibility of outstripping the Phenomenology but the latter is farthest from being a work that may serve as an introduction to Hegel's system.It may not be as easily included in university `reading lists' except in the margins that would be due to the fact that it is not an easy book to teach from the lectern or pulpit and nor was the book really written for reading in universities. Thus while in the universities phenomenology is taught exclusively as a branch of philosophy, Hegel's presence would be very marginal. That need not have been so.PhS can be seen to exceed being a book for introduction to Hegel's systematic philosophy for reasons such as : a] as the first book of phenomenology, it is breathtaking in its coverage and scope; b] it is a lively exposition pulsating with the dialectic as  a method of movement, `that is the method of science' with infinite potentiality; c] the dialectic is shown to work as an organizing principle of scientific exposition;d]almost all the concepts of his system prefigure with considerable clarity in PhS; e] teaches critical method in the movement from one field to the next with precision and economy of thought;f] takes up all the subjects of the system from logic,speculative philosophy, world history, ethics,aesthetics, politics, law, morals and right,religion,ontology,phenomenology as science of knowledge,philosophers philosophies and psychology/philosophy of mind in terms of the notion/concept as a beginning and unfolding;g]data structures of history are bereft of their individuality and shown to belong to the movement of self-consciousness involving high level of enquiry for making comparisons, to show the truth of historical `facts' by links of reason even where the results are no dramatic remaining `unadorned' perhaps why there is a definite historical intuition over and above references at work;h]as a book standing on its own not for reasons of any `system' but in the anti-systemic sense. It may be suggested that just a reading of PhS and Science of logic together with his the Philosophy of Right is already more than enough material for grasping his philosophy in both ways : systematically and anti-systematically.
  
Consciousness meant something vastly different than Kant and Fichte. The philosophy of his age arose from the need that conditions created such as estrangement, oppositions and prevalent antagonisms in civil society. Rather than being a possession qualified subjectively as it was with Kant and the unresolved diremption in Fichte's self-identity whose habitat, pure consciousness could not stay as though solipsistically. Hegel countered Fichte by showing the real site of consciousness as the restless indwelling spirit in terms of individuality and as the indwelling spirit of community throbbing with life and inconceivable as standing apart from community.However, in either realm consciousness would be embodied and opposed to itself, as self-alienation.PhG is more like a time producing shapes of opposing consciousness, which get reconciled in a time line considered even in epochal terms.These shapes are shown to emerge in various cultures as aesthetics that religion creates.Further it is relevant to keep in mind facts such as Hegel suspending the ontological meaning of ethical life and politics , which Hegel did by 1803-4.The very absence of consciousness by Aristotle, who emphasized the course of natural teleology was sufficient to move away fro Aristotle. Aristotle is suspended in the same way that religion and God had been taken out of the History of Philosophy.Instead of classical Greek philosophy the emphasis on pre-Socratic philosophy that were being discovered in that age  could inspire any serious < not like deadly serious> reader to start reading about the Ionian `stuff' or Zeno's flux or the reaming fragments of Heraclitus, Plato's `Parmenides'.The spirit, according to Hegel was capable to breathing life into dead bones by vitue of `method' enabling the spirit to become pure science.Here I would like to add an experience shared by many others which is that hardly anybody  inclined to studying philosophy could or did access a book like PdG straight away, directly without enough knowledge about philosophy. The earliest books that read were classical philosophers. The earliest association philosophy had emphasized themes like religion, morals and some formal logic.But I am not talking about them; what needs be said is that it was Marx who made Hegel stand on his head while also castigating him at times, sarcastically, while always learning from good old Hegel that went into a huge wave of Hegel reception, to say the least, unlike earlier.
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To even search for a introduction to any system, per see elicits a standard response which displaces the question in a way close to Kant turning away from his own efforts that had the `infinite merit' of restoring what were the central principles of philosophy, - ontology, synthetic/analytic judgments,the laws of identity and difference,consciousness, dialectic and speculative philosophy above all. Kant sees in the consciousness which gives shape to reason out of the materials available in specific times  as the unknown and unknowable. Instead of pushing the activity of immanent Reason from consciousness in the `objective' world that is identical with the subject that would have produced a phenomenology, Kant is seen by Hegel as `betraying' the principles that makes philosophy possible by surrendering Reason to Understanding, transforming the infinite meditations of consciousness that is active in the real world to the unknowable, Kant makes the manifold world of unfolding appearances, which may have been mediated by the derived essence of speculative philosophy into an abstraction or makes abstraction as the ultimate generalization.An abstraction of this order of magnitude provides the illusion of being reason, which makes reason as something finite.The opposition of phenomena to noumea that Kant makes central, since even the structure of ''nouemata'' is hardly an advance from Aristotle whereas the veil of mystical < secret kind of knowing> after reaching the limits of understanding, Kant begins to talk about the fallibility , defect, lack, deficiency of human cognition, activity of thinking. But the demands of infinity that lingers from the original moment when the principle got formulated though later transformed and justified as ''a priori'' and further as the unity of a perception. Turning to the side of subject, subjectivity, etc, Kant makes that to be the active side that wills, aims towards actualizing the ends of moral-ethical order like the ceaseless activity of what he calls `ought'. Yet there emerges once again the inability, activity that has within itself some shortcoming or defect which becomes like a wall or a barrier, eliminating the possibility for identity with the end.
  
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Instead of the  ought that is also an out-and-out positivity , Kant factors the transcendental as the basic property any subject's consciousness. In a self-alienated, estranged and sundered world whose reflection's are Kantian antimony, Hegel credits Fichte for remaining or holding truly to the speculative principle by keeping the the subject-object identity right till the end though the initial I=I type identity was used with enthusiasm, towards the closing part of his system the said principle gets stressed and strained when Fichte returns to Kant for taking up the ought as providing proof for his identity logic in a one sided manner that forgets the simple opposite of any `ought', namely while it is possible for ought to reach as close as possible to the sublime `world', it is equally true for the ought that fails to come anywhere close to the said proximal.If something can be done then what remains of the positivity if it cannot be done? Thus the ought contains a strong , irreconcilable opposition within itself, which Fichte attempts to resolve by making the object as conditioned by the subject through relations though  conditioning  of the object does not eliminate autonomous self-identity of the object.
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Hegel was an astute reader, extraordinarily gifted by nature that freed him from  innocence and misunderstanding.The all-too-human modesty of Hegel has often been interpreted as his conservative side that weighed heavier than the revolutionary side of dialectic by someone as perceptive of German philosophy like Engels. The two main concerns of Hegel in his lifetime was religion/church and state/despotism. During his youth Hegel was openly talking about the church that practices the despotism of the state and by the close of his lifetime, the interactivity between these two oppressive institutions wee such that Germany was stuck up in a morass of semi-feudalism. Following from this concern, Hegel's legacy was immediately political after the initial theological spurt.PhS can be read as a cummulum of that move.A metaphor of a ladder may be conjured up in order to `climb from PhS to Science of logic and after that the ladder may well be away. As instances of what he thought that was put to writing then what Hegel wrote are perhaps closest to authenticate his cognition, method and orientation while they may be more difficult to grasp as fast as his transcribed lecture notes.
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Consciousness meant something vastly different than Kant and Fichte. The philosophy of his age arose from the need that conditions created such as estrangement, oppositions and prevalent antagonisms in civil society. Rather than being a possession qualified subjectively as it was with Kant and the unresolved diremption in Fichte's self-identity whose habitat, pure consciousness could not stay as though solipsistic ally. Hegel countered Fichte by showing the real site of consciousness as the restless indwelling spirit in terms of individuality and as the indwelling spirit of community throbbing with life and inconceivable as standing apart from the `sociality of reason'.However, in either realm consciousness would be embodied and opposed to itself, as self-alienation.PhG is the work of time producing shapes of opposing consciousness, which get reconciled in a time line considered in epochal terms.These shapes are shown to emerge in various cultures as aesthetics that religion creates.Further it is relevant to keep in mind facts such as Hegel suspending the ontological meaning of  ethical life and politics by 1803-4.The very absence of consciousness by Aristotle, who emphasized the course of natural teleology was sufficient to move away fro Aristotle. Aristotle is suspended in the same way that religion and God had been taken out of the History of Philosophy.
  
 
This response is sensitive to historical contexts, durations and time especially when the subject is Hegel, whose life mysteriously co-coincided with historical drifts.
 
This response is sensitive to historical contexts, durations and time especially when the subject is Hegel, whose life mysteriously co-coincided with historical drifts.
  
There is no dispute that the aftermath of PdG casts a shadow on Hegel's post-Jena work.Its opaque effect that befalls any reader in these times pertains to the language of PdG.It is thought that speaks to itself and equally listens, which arranges density, clears confusions in the manner of the incipient language  of early Greek philosophy, rich in phonetic attributes through utterance.Hegel brings philosophers of antiquity upto date.Truths uttered 2500 years ago by philosophy remain truths as of now and well into the future.He deploys a fair amount of native dialects and vernacular traditions that would read not too refined and even clumsy when ordered grammatically.Urges and instinct are more than ambivalent when they end up saying `yes' and `no' at the same time.These paradoxicals come on their own through the medium of instincts and Hegel, it seems, hardly reversed his `urges' though they were kept as negative moments of dialectic.There are other instances of psychic life that brings out the simple naivete.Unlike Egyptians who saw language and words emanating from God's mouth, Hegel was earthier who figured language acquisition as a child's spontaneous mental growth.He could never turn towards any deciphering, like hiero-glyphs, the Egyptian written language made up of sacred signs.  
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There is no dispute that the aftermath of PhS casts a shadow on Hegel's post-Jena work.Its opaque effect that befalls any reader in these times pertains to the language of PhS.It is thought that speaks to itself and equally listens, which arranges density, clears confusions in the manner of the incipient language  of early Greek philosophy, rich in phonetic attributes through utterance.Hegel brings philosophers of antiquity up to date.Truths uttered 2500 years ago by philosophy remain truths as of now and well into the future.He deploys a fair amount of native dialects and vernacular traditions that may be unrefined and even clumsy when ordered grammatically.Urges and instinct are more than ambivalent when they end up saying `yes' and `no' at the same time.These paradoxicals come on their own through the medium of instincts and Hegel, it seems, hardly reversed his `urges' though they were kept as negative moments of dialectic.There are other instances of psychic life that brings out the simple naivete.Unlike Egyptians who saw language and words emanating from God's mouth, Hegel was earthier who figured language acquisition as belonging to spontaneous mental growth.  
  
However, I would be cautious about mentioning the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in comparative terms with PdG and WL.I know this may sound trite but not without its worth to state the only other book that Hegel wrote was Wissenschaft Logik[WL]. Given this standard of comparison, the only justification for inveighing PdG over WL could only be due to refractive and/or ethereal affect.The importance of WL over PdG lies in the realm of cognition or Philosophy as such. Phenomenology of Spirit, or the study of opposing consciousness [ subject-object to subject-subject relations]is presupposed in WL, which elaborates the method proper to philosophy as science.The method of Philosophy lies in its being freed from oppositions of consciousness showing up in the phenomenal worlds, which is quiet different from `freeing the mind from misconceptions'.
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However, I would be cautious about mentioning the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in comparative terms with PdG and WL.I know this may sound trite but not without its worth to state the only other book that Hegel wrote was Wissenschaft Logik[WL]. Given this standard of comparison, the only justification for inveighing PhS over Science of Logic could only be due to refractive and/or ethereal affect.The importance of Science of Logic over PhS lies in the realm of cognition or Philosophy as such. Phenomenology of Spirit, or the study of opposing consciousness [ subject-object to subject-subject relations]is presupposed in Science of Logic, which elaborates the method proper to philosophy as science.The method of Philosophy lies in its being freed from oppositions of consciousness showing up in the phenomenal worlds, which is quiet different from `freeing the mind from misconceptions'.
  
If Kai means by Hegel's Phenomenology a "ladder", <<comparable maybe to  Wittgenstein's own rendering of Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus>>,"because Philosophy does not start from the blue", that would fall in an area of deep-seated disputation. For one,PdG has a definite point of departure, the beginning, so to speak, in sense-experience.
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If Kai means by Hegel's Phenomenology a "ladder", <<comparable maybe to  Wittgenstein's own rendering of Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus>>,"because Philosophy does not start from the blue", that would fall in an area of deep-seated disputation. For one,PhD has a definite point of departure, the beginning, so to speak, in sense-experience.
  
The first chapter of Phenomenology is the world of immediate experience and all the subsequent phenomenologies,beginning with Brentano-Husserl have `experience' as constituting the substrata of their analysis.Second, the metaphor `ladder' can also be thrown away after climbing the last step, as suggested by Wittgenstein. Here, Kai does not provide the consequential logic of the `ladder'; should it be kept, internalized or thrown away, externalized or what? The formulation also begets  answer to the question why did'nt Hegel extend whatever he did write in PdG under his earlier piece titled Philosophie der Geistes'?  
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The first chapter of Phenomenology is the world of immediate experience and all the subsequent phenomenologies,beginning with Brentano-Husserl have `experience' as constituting the substrata of their analysis.Second, the metaphor `ladder' can also be thrown away after climbing the last step, as suggested by Wittgenstein. Here, Kai does not provide the consequential logic of the `ladder'; should it be kept, internalized or thrown away, externalized or what? The formulation also begets  answer to the question why didn't Hegel extend whatever he did write in PhS into his earlier piece titled Philosophie der Geistes'?  
  
 
Moreover, one cannot overlook the transition problem of moving from `here' to `there' while moving from Phenomenology to Philosophy.In Encyclopedia Logik,Hegel puts Phenomenology between Anthropology as the presupposed part and Psychology as the following part.All the three subjects - Anthropology, Phenomenology and Psychology- came under Philosophy.  
 
Moreover, one cannot overlook the transition problem of moving from `here' to `there' while moving from Phenomenology to Philosophy.In Encyclopedia Logik,Hegel puts Phenomenology between Anthropology as the presupposed part and Psychology as the following part.All the three subjects - Anthropology, Phenomenology and Psychology- came under Philosophy.  
  
Kai's `talk' self-negates, if not his own construct but certainly a construct that says 1)it is not necessary to read and get stuck up in the Preface to PdG before/after reading the main body of the text and 2]that PdG is not necessary for `grasping' anything that Hegel wrote afterwords, his system, ''if''''Philosophie der Geistes'', 1803-'04,The Jena System, 1804-'05 and Jena'' Realphilosophie'', 1805-'06 is read.The argument is that in these writings all that was hurriedly written by Hegel had already been covered up in the earlier writings where, moreover, the subjects - logic, nature,spirit/mind/history/aesthetics - make a better template for reading all that Hegel wrote after PdG.Kai sees PdG as a work that systematically includes [`sublated']"all reasonable perspectives from all philosophers before him" and none of these philosophers used Phenomenology to teach and come to conclusions.
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Kai's `talk' self-negates, if not his own construct but certainly a construct that says 1)it is not necessary to read and get stuck up in the Preface to PdG before/after reading the main body of the text and 2]that PhS is not necessary for `grasping' anything that Hegel wrote afterwords, his system, ''if''''Philosophie der Geistes'', 1803-'04,The Jena System, 1804-'05 and Jena'' Realphilosophie'', 1805-'06 is read.The argument is that in these writings all that was hurriedly written by Hegel had already been covered up in the earlier writings where, moreover, the subjects - logic, nature,spirit/mind/history/aesthetics - make a better template for reading all that Hegel wrote after PhS.Kai sees PhS as a work that systematically includes [`sublated']"all reasonable perspectives from all philosophers before him" and none of these philosophers used Phenomenology to teach and come to conclusions.This is a strange thing to say. It amounts to denying a breakthrough in the domain of philosophy to Hegel. I mean even somebody like Charles S Pierce says that Hegel was the first modern Realist philosopher while others had been nominalists.
  
 
== CLARIFYING PHENOMENOLOGY ==
 
== CLARIFYING PHENOMENOLOGY ==
  
Why was this the case ? Does it make Hegel's ''PdG'' a work of some maverick? As a matter of fact, Hegel viewed Kant's philosophy very close to a phenomenology for giving a theory of consciousness from the appearance of the subject to an object but, as usual, could not push through the concept that would show the truth of the said relation for he could not go beyond appearances. Actually this a-symmetry of Kant's thought has been pointed out repeatedly by Hegel too many times.At any rate, Hegel pushes the argument not just in  terms of the shapes of subject-object relations in the experiencing consciousness but goes much further on the direction of positing the truths of all relations, including self-relations, thereby negating the aporias of Kant.
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Why was this the case ? Does it make Hegel's ''PhS'' a work of some maverick? As a matter of fact, Hegel viewed Kant's philosophy very close to a phenomenology for giving a theory of consciousness from the appearance of the subject to an object but, as usual, could not push through the concept that would show the truth of the said relation for he could not go beyond appearances. Actually this a-symmetry of Kant's thought has been pointed out repeatedly by Hegel too many times.At any rate, Hegel pushes the argument not just in  terms of the shapes of subject-object relations in the experiencing consciousness but goes much further on the direction of positing the truths of all relations, including self-relations, thereby negating the aporias of Kant.
  
  
In the realm of philosophy, Hegel observed that with Kant, `consciousness' was "essentially a property", not  as the abstract of `ordinary consciousness', but as a derivative property of the  transcendental a ''a priori'',i.e.the rules governing our knowledge.Kant will regard such properties as `mental representations', which if anything, are  our own.Only in the 20th c. did Sohn-Rethel, who studied Kant under Heidegger, considered grounding the Kantian a priori of transcendental aperception in the reality of the socially abstract commodity world from a Marxist perspective.But this is relative verification, which is not what Kant suggested.  
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In the realm of philosophy, Hegel observed that with Kant, `consciousness' was "essentially a property", not  as the abstract of `ordinary consciousness', but as a derivative property of the  transcendental a ''a priori'',i.e.the rules governing our knowledge.Kant will regard such properties as `mental representations', which if anything, are  our own.Only in the 20th c. did Sohn-Rethel, who studied Kant under Heidegger, considered grounding the Kantian a priori of transcendental in the reality of the socially abstract commodity world from a Marxist perspective.But this is relative verification, which is not what Kant suggested.  
  
Hegel opposed ''Geistes''/ Spirit, as Mind such as understood by Alcemeon of Creaton [500-450 B C], the ancient Greek writer on medicine but who was the first to discover the brain as the seat and power, understanding and perception united in mind, or, possessing the power to equalize opposites <wet/dry; hot/cold;sweet/bitter, etc.>, which he designated by the use of the original term for democracy, i.e., '''''isonomia'''''.  
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Hegel proposed ''Geistes''/ Spirit, as Mind such as understood by Alcemeon of Creaton [500-450 B C], the ancient Greek writer on medicine, who was the first to discover the brain as the seat and power, understanding and perception in a harmonious united in mind, or, possessing the power to equalize opposites <wet/dry; hot/cold;sweet/bitter, etc.>, which he designated by the use of the original term for democracy, i.e., '''''isonomia'''''.  
  
 
Hegel could derive speculatively that this Mind <brain> was not stuck up or submerged either in nature or reflection/representation, but has the power to raise itself in increasing degrees, like inspiration, from conventions, blind faith, superstitions so as to unite the single consciousness with the real, vital feelings animating the community.Such "indwelling spirit of community", the ''prius'' of ''Geistes'' emerging as a co-relate, or consciousness that is on-and-for-itself would both subordinate and transform, ''aufhaben''/sublate by exposition of laws expressing relations of subordinate-mutual reciprocity in the commons [of life]. This would be the Spirit/''Geistes'' having suspended its subjective nature of consciousness.
 
Hegel could derive speculatively that this Mind <brain> was not stuck up or submerged either in nature or reflection/representation, but has the power to raise itself in increasing degrees, like inspiration, from conventions, blind faith, superstitions so as to unite the single consciousness with the real, vital feelings animating the community.Such "indwelling spirit of community", the ''prius'' of ''Geistes'' emerging as a co-relate, or consciousness that is on-and-for-itself would both subordinate and transform, ''aufhaben''/sublate by exposition of laws expressing relations of subordinate-mutual reciprocity in the commons [of life]. This would be the Spirit/''Geistes'' having suspended its subjective nature of consciousness.
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== REVISITING HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY DER GEISTES ==
 
== REVISITING HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY DER GEISTES ==
  
Kai also considers the conservative construct, mostly those who are inclined towards reading Hegel in a theological sense.Even if almost all of their positions is granted, I would insist why is it compulsive for them to omit the Preface? The Preface is no configuration for what Hegel wrote later.I think that what Hegel says about the truth as the Bacchic ravel the choreographic moment of the rose in the cross, does not sit comfortably with the theologians. But then, even in terms of theology, Christians do not have any monopoly over Hegel on the subject.
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Kai also considers the conservative construct, mostly those who are inclined towards reading Hegel in a theological sense.Even if almost all of their positions are granted, I would insist why is it compulsive for them to omit the Preface? The Preface is no configuration for what Hegel wrote later.I think that what Hegel says about the truth as the Bacchic ravel the choreographic moment of the rose in the cross, does not sit comfortably with the theologians. But then, even in terms of theology, Christians do not have any monopoly over Hegel on the subject.
  
 
On the other hand, the analytical, neo-Kantian, `phenomenological' and positivist/empiricist thinker would also prefer to dispense with the Preface because of the manner of Hegel's break with Descartes, identity logic and the self-certain Ego as the I, when "I say `I', this singular `I', I say in general all `I's'; everyone is what I say, everyone is `I' the singular" [ ''''PdG'''', 83].However, the sense of it can be felt by  radicalized souls who  see ''''PdG'''' as a book that constitutes a ‎break with previous philosophies in the same way that Heraclitus' systemic notion marked a ‎revolutionary moment in the history of philosophy, according to Hegel.
 
On the other hand, the analytical, neo-Kantian, `phenomenological' and positivist/empiricist thinker would also prefer to dispense with the Preface because of the manner of Hegel's break with Descartes, identity logic and the self-certain Ego as the I, when "I say `I', this singular `I', I say in general all `I's'; everyone is what I say, everyone is `I' the singular" [ ''''PdG'''', 83].However, the sense of it can be felt by  radicalized souls who  see ''''PdG'''' as a book that constitutes a ‎break with previous philosophies in the same way that Heraclitus' systemic notion marked a ‎revolutionary moment in the history of philosophy, according to Hegel.
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Other than this ,to wit, points 7-10 made by Kai are well accepted. As a matter of fact they just go on to show the congruence between the `structure ' of PdG and Hegel's later system.
 
Other than this ,to wit, points 7-10 made by Kai are well accepted. As a matter of fact they just go on to show the congruence between the `structure ' of PdG and Hegel's later system.
  
To begin with the production side of the first book on Phenomenology, the '''`Geistes''''/Spirits  was part of the first, original title covering around 750 pages in all, the number of pages being equivalent to the number of copies released in April 1807 and published by J Hoffmeister in Hamburg/Bamberg.Hegel reached there in Jan. 1807, remained preoccupied with the book-release in April, 1807.Other than  proof reading, because proofing-cum-typesetting-cum-formatting constituted the last stage of publication, self-proofing of handwritten pages by the author must have been made clear, edited, copy-edited, details from contents, written matter for Hoffmeister the publisher, due to Hegel's involvement.
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To begin with the production side of the first book on Phenomenology, the '''`Geistes''''/Spirits  was part of the first, original title covering around 750 pages in all, the number of pages being equivalent to the number of copies released in April 1807 and published by J Hoffmeister in Bamberg.Hegel reached there in Jan. 1807, remained preoccupied with the book-release in April, 1807.Other than  proof reading, because proofing-cum-typesetting-cum-formatting constituted the last stage of publication, self-proofing of handwritten pages by the author must have been made clear, edited, copy-edited, details from contents, written matter for Hoffmeister the publisher, due to Hegel's involvement.
  
 
It was in that period,from January winters, 1807, that he wrote the Preface.Almost the entire book seems written straight, on the singular plane that makes writing a volitional and responsible deed, without too much, rather minimalist reworking of drafts.
 
It was in that period,from January winters, 1807, that he wrote the Preface.Almost the entire book seems written straight, on the singular plane that makes writing a volitional and responsible deed, without too much, rather minimalist reworking of drafts.
  
The thinking that lead to the book, however,covered at least five years prior to its writing.The timing of publication had to await the appearance of Napoleon during the battle of Jena.Hegel had prided' himself for having "predicted the entire upheaval", the revolution in France, and the book "completed the night before the battle of Jena" makes the dramatic point of intersection where the abstract freedom of French republic " passes out of its own self-destructive activity over to another land" that would be Germany.< Letter to Naithammer, Apr. 29, 1814>Jena,for Hegel was this apparent,visible passage of self-consciousness for truth awaiting `refreshment' while remaining in thought, from `the brown rivulet  of coffee' and original `Rhine wine'.This event had to mark and impress the discovery, not recovery,of Phenomenology of Spirit as the novel beginning the ending of ''via moderna''.
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The thinking that lead to the book, however,covered at least five years prior to its writing.Hegel had prided' himself for having "predicted the entire upheaval", the revolution in France, and the book "completed the night before the battle of Jena" makes the dramatic point of intersection where the abstract freedom of French republic " passes out of its own self-destructive activity over to another land" that would be Germany.< Letter to Naithammer, Apr. 29, 1814>Jena,for Hegel was this apparent,visible passage of self-consciousness for truth awaiting `refreshment' while remaining in thought, from `the brown rivulet  of coffee' and original `Rhine wine'.This event had to mark and impress the discovery, not recovery,of Phenomenology of Spirit as the novel beginning the ending of ''via moderna''.
  
The prescencing/appearing of world-spirit completed the labours of philosophy by the philosopher Hegel, given that there was hardly any philosopher who had identified herself with philosophy as Hegel.Sometimes the identification bets so personal and completed that philosophy seems to become an euphemism for the use of `I' by Hegel in certain contexts, by pitching himself as identical with philosophy, Hegel would say in his preface to ''Rechtsphilosophie'' that philosophy arrives late, after the event, like the Owl of Minerva taking flight after the dusk has fallen.  
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It should be kept in mind that given that there was hardly any philosopher who had identified herself with philosophy as much as Hegel.Sometimes the identification bets so personal and completed that philosophy seems to become an euphemism for the use of `I' by Hegel in certain contexts, by pitching himself as identical with philosophy.  
  
Hegel saw a philosophical calling before the world historical spirit and this was resolved by announcing the new born as Phenomenology, as (an already) absolute self-consciousness. The main body comprised in the working of the way by the use of a revolutionary method of the knowledge that knows itself both in endothermic and exothermic unity.I am referring to thermic to signify `fire', the fire that stood for `objective time' for both Heraclitus and Hegel.
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Hegel saw a philosophical calling before the world historical spirit and this was resolved by announcing the new born as Phenomenology, as (an already) absolute self-consciousness. The main body comprised in the working of the way by the use of a revolutionary method of the knowledge that knows itself both in a non-exoteric unity.
  
 
The spirit of the age seen as Napoleon,as the external appearance was destined to get recognized by Hegel for ''`aufheben'''/sublation of all that preceded the arrival of this absolute Spirit,of man as man, at Golgotha, as that level of the brim beyond which the froth spills over.The inner, philosophical engagement and dialoguing with Christianity as religion and spending of long periods of time with Christ would also terminate in a Phenomenology whose contents,the becoming encompassed by consciousness resulted in a Spirit/''`Geist''',which was absolutely adequate for Philosophy that had sublated/''`aufheben''' Religion.
 
The spirit of the age seen as Napoleon,as the external appearance was destined to get recognized by Hegel for ''`aufheben'''/sublation of all that preceded the arrival of this absolute Spirit,of man as man, at Golgotha, as that level of the brim beyond which the froth spills over.The inner, philosophical engagement and dialoguing with Christianity as religion and spending of long periods of time with Christ would also terminate in a Phenomenology whose contents,the becoming encompassed by consciousness resulted in a Spirit/''`Geist''',which was absolutely adequate for Philosophy that had sublated/''`aufheben''' Religion.
  
This needs to be restated somewhat axiomatically, on the diagonal that without the appearance of the exothermic/eternal ''in-and-for-itself'' moment  there would not have been a Phenomenology that would have united the diachronic and the synchronous, the latter prescencing [presenting itself]/`''`Darstellungen''',or in the dramatic progression/procession of consciousness from experience to perception to understanding and force.The orientation and thinking of all that appears before consciousness is posited dynamically.After exposition of the main structure of ''neoma'' < the invisibility of consciousness> consciousness moves to the diachronic plane, i.e., self-consciousness.
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This needs to be restated somewhat axiomatically, on the diagonal that without the appearance of the ''in-and-for-itself'' moment  there would not have been a Phenomenology that would have united the diachronic and the synchronous, the latter prescencing [presenting itself]/`''`Darstellungen''',or in the dramatic progression/procession of consciousness from experience to perception to understanding and force.The orientation and thinking of all that appears before consciousness is posited dynamically.After exposition of the main structure of ''neoma'' < the invisibility of consciousness> consciousness moves to the diachronic plane, i.e., self-consciousness.
  
 
== CONTENTS  ==
 
== CONTENTS  ==
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Freedom starts in the interiority at first, but whenever the opposition externalizes through combats, interiority too externalizes itself as expansive, multiple units of the self. Thus the self that returns back into its indwelling site after the combat is an enriched self that can only progress concretely whenever the action of the future - the time to be made- is universal.In other words,the free self-activity of recognizing consciousness sublates/''`aufheben'' fixed, constant, eternal knowledge of recognized consciousness. In terms of a dialectical procession that consciousness progresses, which makes the truth of freedom as universal, a moment that cannot be grasped  by the recognized consciousness even though it learns about freedom by a limited unity with its other. The limits are the one's that it has already realized in the first two moments of individuality [ in desire]and particularity [of recognition by the other].
 
Freedom starts in the interiority at first, but whenever the opposition externalizes through combats, interiority too externalizes itself as expansive, multiple units of the self. Thus the self that returns back into its indwelling site after the combat is an enriched self that can only progress concretely whenever the action of the future - the time to be made- is universal.In other words,the free self-activity of recognizing consciousness sublates/''`aufheben'' fixed, constant, eternal knowledge of recognized consciousness. In terms of a dialectical procession that consciousness progresses, which makes the truth of freedom as universal, a moment that cannot be grasped  by the recognized consciousness even though it learns about freedom by a limited unity with its other. The limits are the one's that it has already realized in the first two moments of individuality [ in desire]and particularity [of recognition by the other].
  
Hegel's `Phenomenology of Spirit/s' was seen as a journey through a picture gallery later on by Hegel himself and this gallery turns out to be a vision-in-the-making as we move from conceptualizing one picture, as mental image,to another conceptualization to yet another and in this sense Phenomenology is linked to earlier traditions their initial glimmerings may be found in Plato, especially in `Georgias', which is the most paradoxical dialogue marking the great moment in Greek ontology where conceptions/''`ennoiai''' of genera and species/ ''''`ennoimeta''''' end up in thoughts/''`noema'''as concepts/`''''en-noema'''''. Plato introduces these themes and in the course of dialogues the difficulties of the ''themata'' emerge prominently instead of resolutions. Aristotle appealed to internal representations or fractals of Plato's ''`noema'''as a resolution and this was contradicted by Stoical arguments on non-existent representations of thought-objects.  
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Hegel's `Phenomenology of Spirit/s' was seen as a journey through a picture gallery later on by Hegel himself and this gallery turns out to be a vision-in-the-making as we move from conceptualizing one picture, as mental image,to another conceptualization to yet another and in this sense Phenomenology is linked to earlier traditions their initial glimmerings may be found in Plato,marking the great moment in Greek ontology where conceptions/''`ennoiai''' of genera and species/ ''''`ennoimeta''''' end up in thoughts/''`noema'''as concepts/`''''en-noema'''''. Plato introduces these themes and in the course of dialogues the difficulties of the ''themata'' emerge prominently instead of resolutions. Aristotle appealed to internal representations or fractals of Plato's ''`noema'''as a resolution and this was contradicted by Stoical arguments on non-existent representations of thought-objects.  
  
  
Later Stoics used propositional and semantic logic applied to entities/`ens'.Shifted to the ontological terrain, that had already been problematized by Plato but remained suppressed through philology though in Latin the cognates of `''intentio'' were interpreted variously by Sextus Empiricus,Diogenes Leaterus and most prominently, Zeno of Cleanthes.`''Intentio''' had different meanings though as the two-fold division between mental state and mental acts clarified the terms of references.Early Arabic philosophy referred to terms such as ''`ma'na'''and ''`ma'qul''' mean more like `mood' of soul as it occurs in Indian philosophical term,''`mana''' and mental acts that had more to do with practical, `to do' of ontology instead of pure mental states , thought-objects that were self-generating and not as they were mentioned in religious scriptures.
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Later Stoics used propositional and semantic logic applied to entities/`ens'.Shifted to the ontological terrain, that had already been made problematical by Plato but remained suppressed through philology though in Latin the cognates of `''intentio'' were interpreted variously by Sextus Empiricus,Diogenes Leaterus and most prominently, Zeno of Cleanthes.`''Intentio''' had different meanings though as the two-fold division between mental state and mental acts clarified the terms of references.Early Arabic philosophy referred to terms such as ''`ma'na'''and ''`ma'qul''' mean more like `mood' of soul as it occurs in Indian philosophical term,''`mana''' and mental acts that had more to do with practical, `to do' of ontology instead of pure mental states , thought-objects that were self-generating and not as they were mentioned in religious scriptures.
  
 
== SHAPES ==
 
== SHAPES ==
  
Hegel saw these excursions, except for Plato's conceptions and ''ma'na'', as a mood of the soul, as so many pseudo philosophical inanities that had to be cleared. Hegel's task was compounded by such inanities that would block him from even getting a post in a faculty vacancy though diachronic progression developing out of French revolution, even as it appeared in its `old age' before Hegel spurred him to arrive, in the least,maybe as the owl of Minerva, at the intersection with the remains of the spirit of the age.It was at this juncture, after encountering the limit of ethical actuality in politics that Phenomenology could irrupt.
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Hegel saw these excursions, except for Plato's conceptions and ''ma'na'', as a mood of the soul, as so many pseudo philosophical inanities that had to be cleared.
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PhS is mainly an  exposition of reason. Since self-consciousness is reason ` since what had been the negative relation to otherness turns out to be a positive relation' . Reason is the certainty that consciousness has of being all reality. [PhS # 232]
  
Leaving the Preface aside, what Hegel wrote on the abstract ending of the notion of French revolution in Terror, or revolutionary terror as the ''`Feurie des Verschnwadens'''is the description provided by Hegel to show the culminated act of revolution. With this act, the logic of the revolution turned into its opposite, from the dialectical logic it turned into sheer abstraction, or abstract freedom that was unmediated in the act of Terror dissolved all the earlier promises and determinations, turning the intellectual landscape into a barren desert. It is only at this point that the Spirit falls, turns into abyss, into meaninglessness and consequently,  meaningless death.
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Reason reaches  the most critical, spiritless and terrifying point when it assumes the shape of abstract universal freedom when all being of self is emptied into non-being. Subjectivity turns into something like an empty object when thought becomes so bad that ` it becomes difficult to say exactly where the badness lies.[PhS # 340]. This is what happens during French revolution when `the general will' took on the shape of abstract universality of freedom that used virtue leading to suspicion for universal terror with human heds coming under the Guillotine like `cabbages under kitchen knife'. ''`Feurie des Verschnwadens'''is the description provided by Hegel to show the culminated act of revolution. With this act, the logic of the revolution turned into its opposite, from the dialectical logic it turned into sheer abstraction, or abstract freedom that was unmediated in the act of Terror dissolved all the earlier promises and determinations, turning the intellectual landscape into a barren desert. It is only at this point that the Spirit falls, turns into abyss, into meaninglessness and consequently,  meaningless death.
  
The destabilization of the dialectic by abstract unmediated negativity returns us back to the ancients, especially, the problematique of cognition in relation to inadmissible ideas that Plato brings up in `Georgias' and to our own times when we ask, yet again, how can a/any/the dialectic surmount the increasingly resurgent abstract, meaningless actions, thoughtlessly repetitive beating in the heart of current world history.
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The destabilization of the dialectic by abstract unmediated negativity of universal freedom would face revolt from `observing instinct of self-conscious reason' in the principle of individual freedom or the opposition between universal liberty as embodied by the state and the individual liberty that was the principle of liberalism.
  
  
PdG may also be seen as transformation of preconscious to the fully developed form of consciousness is also in addition to the discovery, creating a product ''[eidos''], or idea-product though work is a mark of general, social labour, which is what makes the `we' in Hegel's philosophy..When Hegel worked out the path to write Phenomenology, Kai is correct in tracing its genealogy to 1801-'02, the organization of that, as demanded by cumulative non-quantified logic, in 1806 did not qualify as Phenomenology to Hegel.However one should not infer that Phenomenology is something of an advance from Philosophy. There is a difference and an opposition resulting in subordination of Phenomenology to Logic or the method proper to Philosophy.
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PhS may also be seen as transformation of preconscious to the fully developed form of consciousness is also in addition to the discovery, creating a product ''[eidos''], or idea-product though work is a mark of general, social labour, which is what makes the `we' in Hegel's philosophy..When Hegel worked out the path to write Phenomenology, Kai is correct in tracing its genealogy to 1801-'02, the organization of that, as demanded by cumulative non-quantified logic, in 1806 did not qualify as Phenomenology to Hegel.However one should not infer that Phenomenology is something of an advance from Philosophy. There is a difference and an opposition resulting in subordination of Phenomenology to Logic or the method proper to Philosophy.
  
 
== AESTHETICS ==
 
== AESTHETICS ==
  
Resemblances are and should be deceptive, fully recognized as intrinsic to aesthetics. But in Philosophy, where the right word may be `meme' [ contentious terrain for sure], yet all such acts remain subordinate to the concept [begriff],when the world is actively involved, as with prayers,with the `Enlightenment Idea' about opinion [''doxa]''governing the world.In terms of dialectic Hegel broke a barrier of linearity and the work of 1807 was preceded by a leap that could only be found in the Preface where Hegel shows how and why he breaks from Descartes- the Cartesian Ego.A break that is hardly passive. It is a dialectical sublation that reverses the entire mode of the `''Cogito Ego'' into a past transcended, long dead or eternally passive.Spirit, according to Hegel, cannot infuse life into all the dead bones of Philosophy sunk in oblivion.  
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Resemblances are and should be deceptive, fully recognized as intrinsic to aesthetics. But in Philosophy, where the right word may be `meme' [ contentious terrain for sure], yet all such acts remain subordinate to the concept [begriff],when the world is actively involved, as with prayers,with the `Enlightenment Idea' about opinion [''doxa]''governing the world.In terms of dialectic Hegel broke a barrier of linearity and the work of 1807 was preceded by a leap that could only be found in the Preface where Hegel shows the destabilizing nature of truth as the ravel.  
  
 
To round up what is being said, there is the difference between Hegel's perception of the product of his labours [and the use of `we' by Hegel contains others in the course of work]and the perception of social labour that produced 750 copies. If that is self-evident then the next unity must be the dynamic unity of these two modes of work and perception all the way to the moment of absolute synthetic, non-oppositional/oppositional, non-differentiated/differentiated unity.That would be the work of Spirit.
 
To round up what is being said, there is the difference between Hegel's perception of the product of his labours [and the use of `we' by Hegel contains others in the course of work]and the perception of social labour that produced 750 copies. If that is self-evident then the next unity must be the dynamic unity of these two modes of work and perception all the way to the moment of absolute synthetic, non-oppositional/oppositional, non-differentiated/differentiated unity.That would be the work of Spirit.
  
 
 
== >>>> Dialectic as the unfolding on musico-poetic <complex> plane underlying ‎Phenomenology of Spirit ==
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  Lastly‎, PhS was very much spurred by the 18th c. notion of Education as articulated by Diderot, Voltaire , even Helvetius, Condillac as much as the influence of Hölderlin. I think that the so-called break up between Hegel and Holderlin as caused by latter's failed attempt to assassinate a Guiltier or some political notable has been overstressed. In fact, Holderlin had already retreated to a big depression after his wife's early death leading to madness of a kind. In  a letter to Hegel, Holderlin had made a critique of Fichte's `absolute spirit', which encompassed all reality, resembling post-modern blabber on the absence of any outside.Holderlin made clear that without the object self-consciousness was impossible and without consciousness `I am for myself nothing; absolute self is nothing for me. Hölderlin imparted the notion of Bildung [ popular education] to Geistes. As he wrote to Schelling:" Poetry made me contemplate the Bildung, the formation of character and impulse for improvement.Consciousness of its ground and essence in Geistes/Spirit" provided the material to instinctively inspire him to draft a humanistic journal including poetry.
 
 
1/ The question whether Phenomenologie der Geist' [PhG]is necessary for comprehending Hegel's ‎Philosophical System needs be considered since philosophy demands ‎that it begin without presuppositions, prejuduces of judgments or a priori.
 
 
2/ This does not mean that Wissenschaft der Logik [WL] remains the quintessence for grasping Hegel's philosophy.
 
 
 
3/ One response given by Hegel to a question having similar import before the second edition was ‎going for print, in 1830, evoked  mild humour, but Hegel did not say that any part, section, page, word, ‎etc. needed any change. Nothing should be changed was put across to the publishers. He was ‎emphatic in this response while he would also let others know that the times and mood at Jena of ‎‎1806-'07 was youthful;‎
 
 
‎4/ Even if we were to put matters widely, studying PhG is like the experience of the `new', an attractor, and one may add ‎conventional logic for asserting that his philosophical work in 1806 having written or covered the whole ‎of PhG, as we are given to understand should be studied as well, but the `preference’ for the 1806 ‎drafts have no priority and supposing that were it to be so, this present is definitely not  the time. It is weird to suggest with basic ‎reasonableness why should the Preface that was composed by Hegel while the book was being ‎printed be severed from the book published 1807 since both are open to reading. This question is very ‎absurd since the author himself published PhG with the Preface with no hint about any ambiguity and many themes that crop up in Preface emerge later in a dar more systematic manner.‎
 
 
5/ Hegel's ‎Berlin Phenomenology is another `text' that has yet to receive its due attention. Ignoring or suppressing this shorter and precise version may seem no more than pure and simple `bad faith'. ‎
 
 
6/ Husserl’s, elimination of Hegel’s system was simply reactionary and ‎nowhere close to Kierkegaard since the latter already knew Hegel so well that he even knew other ‎than been foreseen by Hegel’s system, that in parts Hegel’s Philosophy of Right that he took as ethics ‎based on rights was written in order to conceal Hegel’s `bad faith’.
 
 
 
7/ Husserl isolates Hegel from Descartes , Kant, Fichte, not for acknowledging the knowing, as was ‎the case with Kierkegaard, as the composer of the first modern book on Phenomenology but for ‎opposite reasons, attacking Hegel as a `system builder', `unscientific', lacking a critique of reason and other inanities said by Husserl together with the winning chorus of post-1870’s Germany, after `defeating ‎metaphysics’ and `philosophy of science’ while hailing technology in ascent, in the universities and ‎faculties, while accepting the subservience to major ‎growth industries by doing research on their behalf.
 
 
 
‎‎8/ The supreme irony that can now be stated with the benefit of hindsight, to be explicit, consisted ‎in the difference that with ''PdG'' as the presupposition in sublating/aufhaben moments in WL, Hegel wold go on to write on truth as something like a circle that has its beginning and ending joined at any point, absolute idea of ‎science in the Science of Logic that was the next presupposition of the elaboration of the Hegelian ‎system of `philosophical science', as it was elaborated in the university,‎ arrives at the point for `lecturing on any science' and academic discipline.
 
 
9/ Because the truths of philosophy, even as independent proposition depend upon the context ‎when the system was founded, or as stated without any paradox or indeterminacy, "Unless it is a ‎system philosophy is not a scientific production";‎
 
 
10/ Since the value of philosophy only made sense as a part of interdependence and/with `organic ‎whole', any  advanced state of mind, which was found in plenitude in many commons such as the ‎‎`we', `communion in the sphere of religion', `common language', etc. is in a position to see the real in ‎the unapparent, < unapparent connections are truer than apparent ones'- Heraclitus > and that is also ‎the point of access to science, its dimensions as explored  in Hegel's Phenomenology as the science of ‎both laws and unfolding of consciousness.‎‎
 
 
11/ The urge to certainty, exactitude was the work of uncovering all the moments of ‎Reason, which is a Section in ''PdG'' that the critics just overlook since they are neither ready to devote ‎attention and  study beginning to look like a rarity, while they would readily jump to conclusions only to create confusion ‎from their confused faculty to reason or even see the Real mainly by pointing to the bare externals, as ‎obtains in the apparently arbitrary nature of the table of contents, which combines Latin and Greek ‎letters, roman-English letters, affixed double letters - AA,BB.DD, etc.- absence of numerals and so forth ‎
 
 
16/ e.g., in Philosophy of Mind', under the rubric Self-Consciousness, the first part under the Greek ‎alpha, Appetite corresponds to the sense-certainty of PdG, holding `desire' within,double-alpha would correspond to the ''noema'' of perception and self-consciousness ‎negative under the Greek sign `beta' would correspond to PdG section on `Lordship and Bondage', ‎holding `recognition' within and universal self consciousness under the Greek letter epsilon does not, ‎as the moment of sublation has any identical equivalent, though it is subsumed in its meaning as ‎belonging to the sphere of Right as `self-certainty .
 
 
 
17/ Lastly‎,the reason for putting PdG on a musico-poetic plane/scale owes  to the influence of Hölderlin.In  a letter to Hegel, Holderlin made a critique of Fichte's `absolute spirit', which encompassed all reality, resembling post-modern blabber on the absence of any outside.Holderlin made clear that without the object self-consciousness was impossible and without consciousness `I am for myself nothing; absolute self is nothing for me. Hölderlin imparted the notion of Bildung [ popular education] to Geistes. As he wrote to Schelling:" Poetry made me contemplate the Bildung, the formation of character and impulse for improvement.Consciousness of its ground and essence in Geistes/Spirit" provided the material to instinctively inspire him to draft a humanistic journal including poetry.
 
  
 
Hölderlin sought how to make the transition from prose to poetry and, with it, the transience of the body.
 
Hölderlin sought how to make the transition from prose to poetry and, with it, the transience of the body.

Revision as of 21:52, 14 March 2009

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Introduction

The subject of this talk started as a response to Kai Froeb's `Is the Phenomenology needed or recommended as introduction to Hegel's System.'After scribbling palimpsest jotting primitives to approximate the opening chapter of Hegel's Phenomenology,[PhS, hereafter] it was clear that starting with pure immediacy as indicated by `this', `what',`that', not-this, not what',`not-that' were all simply abstract in a twofold character. The moment this' is uttered about any smell or sound it is as immediate for senses as the passage to `not-this' as that moves away sooner than a blink by another immediacy.This is like the flow of time.In language, to say `this is' would already grant a movement to the `is'as something more or less of `that'.

There are no suppositions, like axioms or knowledge required at all to say `this'. For reason the being that is `this' is as simple an abstraction as its nothing,`not-this'.There is no relation between them. Each this is equally non-this, which makes a unity;the fluidity in the immediate passage of the not-this to the this is an equal unity.None are true even as facts for they are not separate things.Saying that `nothing is' is ridiculous for senses but that is not so for reason.Reason grasps that nothing is that escapes senses. What is true can only be for reason and that takes effort by reason to raise these simple unities to a level when the flux can be perceived. Hegel's phenomenology is not any `first philosophy'. As a first, the truth of sense is untrue. Only when its unities are raised to a higher region do we arrive at the truth of self-certainty. But the level of perception can only have the truth by removing the immediacy of senses. Perception preserves sense-experience by annulling its immediacy without annihilating it.The term `sublate' means to preserve/keep the predecessor as a negative, as mediation.

Sense-experience is explored as  simple immediacy. These get negated by the consciousness, which is in motion due to the simulation and excitation of the senses on Mind. The truths of sense-certainty are posited empirically; they are facts of consciousness. What is, is not and what is not, is.

The `dialectic of sense-certainty' like natural consciousness is the `simple history of its movement.[ Ref. Pinkard, Terry, Phenomenology of Mind', Zusatz,109, put in single quotes] What is learnt from experience is easily forgotten and erroneous sequences repeat themselves. Through the medium of consciousness, reason makes the simple abstraction that in this truth of experience lies the truth all of experiences.Yet the very vastness of experience coming and ceasing in the abyss of duration cannot be enveloped by perception and reason.Like the first contact that initiates by opening a dimension this is invisible, that is when reason steps in not to designate the invisible as absolute as to establish the level of perception that sustains the visible of sense experience. For consciousness there opens up the dimension of interiority as the condition for sustaining the ground of possibility including contingency.We begin by opposing the argument that seeks agreement on the empirical presence of nothing can be experienced by sense-experience for establishing the truth about sensuous things.

Even animals are aware of the `mystery of bread and wine' as the simple negative that is celebrated by the whole of nature.It is not the difference or the opposition of being and non-being. Only in perception is nothing the condition for any determinate.Now the reception of being passes the the action of negative into the phenomenal world. The plenitude of being in world resulting from original mediation leads to the self relation of negative by splitting/saundering to retreat/withdraw into interiority as the essence of separate and manifold phenomenon.The determinate nothing is inverted appearance,showing like `doubled sublation', as unknown. It is conceptualized as an abstraction, which again is the medium for `thinghood'. The essence, as self-alienating is posited in consciousness as `contradictory'.However, conditions for dialectic shows up in the clearing as consciousness reflects on it to register a transformation of movement to development, e.g., the singular unity of things are now a multiplicity and diversity.

What is said in the first two sections of PhS is a mode of sublation externalizing what gets preserved open to external influences and that which was caused to cease or ended would be the neomatic curvature resembling non-linear "movement of returning back to itself, reflection into self or a self-relation of inner time-dialectic. By now the break with Kant's aporias, antinomies is crystal clear.

At any rate, going by the history of acceptance of Hegel's texts/books, Jena Phenomenology has possibly been accepted and even read much more than any other text/transcriptions/books at least in the previous century. Only the Philosophy of Right carries the possibility of outstripping the Phenomenology but the latter is farthest from being a work that may serve as an introduction to Hegel's system.It may not be as easily included in university `reading lists' except in the margins that would be due to the fact that it is not an easy book to teach from the lectern or pulpit and nor was the book really written for reading in universities. Thus while in the universities phenomenology is taught exclusively as a branch of philosophy, Hegel's presence would be very marginal. That need not have been so.PhS can be seen to exceed being a book for introduction to Hegel's systematic philosophy for reasons such as : a] as the first book of phenomenology, it is breathtaking in its coverage and scope; b] it is a lively exposition pulsating with the dialectic as a method of movement, `that is the method of science' with infinite potentiality; c] the dialectic is shown to work as an organizing principle of scientific exposition;d]almost all the concepts of his system prefigure with considerable clarity in PhS; e] teaches critical method in the movement from one field to the next with precision and economy of thought;f] takes up all the subjects of the system from logic,speculative philosophy, world history, ethics,aesthetics, politics, law, morals and right,religion,ontology,phenomenology as science of knowledge,philosophers philosophies and psychology/philosophy of mind in terms of the notion/concept as a beginning and unfolding;g]data structures of history are bereft of their individuality and shown to belong to the movement of self-consciousness involving high level of enquiry for making comparisons, to show the truth of historical `facts' by links of reason even where the results are no dramatic remaining `unadorned' perhaps why there is a definite historical intuition over and above references at work;h]as a book standing on its own not for reasons of any `system' but in the anti-systemic sense. It may be suggested that just a reading of PhS and Science of logic together with his the Philosophy of Right is already more than enough material for grasping his philosophy in both ways : systematically and anti-systematically.

To even search for a introduction to any system, per see elicits a standard response which displaces the question in a way close to Kant turning away from his own efforts that had the `infinite merit' of restoring what were the central principles of philosophy, - ontology, synthetic/analytic judgments,the laws of identity and difference,consciousness, dialectic and speculative philosophy above all. Kant sees in the consciousness which gives shape to reason out of the materials available in specific times as the unknown and unknowable. Instead of pushing the activity of immanent Reason from consciousness in the `objective' world that is identical with the subject that would have produced a phenomenology, Kant is seen by Hegel as `betraying' the principles that makes philosophy possible by surrendering Reason to Understanding, transforming the infinite meditations of consciousness that is active in the real world to the unknowable, Kant makes the manifold world of unfolding appearances, which may have been mediated by the derived essence of speculative philosophy into an abstraction or makes abstraction as the ultimate generalization.An abstraction of this order of magnitude provides the illusion of being reason, which makes reason as something finite.The opposition of phenomena to noumea that Kant makes central, since even the structure of nouemata is hardly an advance from Aristotle whereas the veil of mystical < secret kind of knowing> after reaching the limits of understanding, Kant begins to talk about the fallibility , defect, lack, deficiency of human cognition, activity of thinking. But the demands of infinity that lingers from the original moment when the principle got formulated though later transformed and justified as a priori and further as the unity of a perception. Turning to the side of subject, subjectivity, etc, Kant makes that to be the active side that wills, aims towards actualizing the ends of moral-ethical order like the ceaseless activity of what he calls `ought'. Yet there emerges once again the inability, activity that has within itself some shortcoming or defect which becomes like a wall or a barrier, eliminating the possibility for identity with the end.

Instead of the  ought that is also an out-and-out positivity , Kant factors the transcendental as the basic property any subject's consciousness. In a self-alienated, estranged and sundered world whose reflection's are Kantian antimony, Hegel credits Fichte for remaining or holding truly to the speculative principle by keeping the the subject-object identity right till the end though the initial I=I type identity was used with enthusiasm, towards the closing part of his system the said principle gets stressed and strained when Fichte returns to Kant for taking up the ought as providing proof for his identity logic in a one sided manner that forgets the simple opposite of any `ought', namely while it is possible for ought to reach as close as possible to the sublime `world', it is equally true for the ought that fails to come anywhere close to the said proximal.If something can be done then what remains of the positivity if it cannot be done? Thus the ought contains a strong , irreconcilable opposition within itself, which Fichte attempts to resolve by making the object as conditioned by the subject through relations though  conditioning  of the object does not eliminate autonomous self-identity of the object. 

Hegel was an astute reader, extraordinarily gifted by nature that freed him from innocence and misunderstanding.The all-too-human modesty of Hegel has often been interpreted as his conservative side that weighed heavier than the revolutionary side of dialectic by someone as perceptive of German philosophy like Engels. The two main concerns of Hegel in his lifetime was religion/church and state/despotism. During his youth Hegel was openly talking about the church that practices the despotism of the state and by the close of his lifetime, the interactivity between these two oppressive institutions wee such that Germany was stuck up in a morass of semi-feudalism. Following from this concern, Hegel's legacy was immediately political after the initial theological spurt.PhS can be read as a cummulum of that move.A metaphor of a ladder may be conjured up in order to `climb from PhS to Science of logic and after that the ladder may well be away. As instances of what he thought that was put to writing then what Hegel wrote are perhaps closest to authenticate his cognition, method and orientation while they may be more difficult to grasp as fast as his transcribed lecture notes.

Consciousness meant something vastly different than Kant and Fichte. The philosophy of his age arose from the need that conditions created such as estrangement, oppositions and prevalent antagonisms in civil society. Rather than being a possession qualified subjectively as it was with Kant and the unresolved diremption in Fichte's self-identity whose habitat, pure consciousness could not stay as though solipsistic ally. Hegel countered Fichte by showing the real site of consciousness as the restless indwelling spirit in terms of individuality and as the indwelling spirit of community throbbing with life and inconceivable as standing apart from the `sociality of reason'.However, in either realm consciousness would be embodied and opposed to itself, as self-alienation.PhG is the work of time producing shapes of opposing consciousness, which get reconciled in a time line considered in epochal terms.These shapes are shown to emerge in various cultures as aesthetics that religion creates.Further it is relevant to keep in mind facts such as Hegel suspending the ontological meaning of ethical life and politics by 1803-4.The very absence of consciousness by Aristotle, who emphasized the course of natural teleology was sufficient to move away fro Aristotle. Aristotle is suspended in the same way that religion and God had been taken out of the History of Philosophy.

This response is sensitive to historical contexts, durations and time especially when the subject is Hegel, whose life mysteriously co-coincided with historical drifts.

There is no dispute that the aftermath of PhS casts a shadow on Hegel's post-Jena work.Its opaque effect that befalls any reader in these times pertains to the language of PhS.It is thought that speaks to itself and equally listens, which arranges density, clears confusions in the manner of the incipient language of early Greek philosophy, rich in phonetic attributes through utterance.Hegel brings philosophers of antiquity up to date.Truths uttered 2500 years ago by philosophy remain truths as of now and well into the future.He deploys a fair amount of native dialects and vernacular traditions that may be unrefined and even clumsy when ordered grammatically.Urges and instinct are more than ambivalent when they end up saying `yes' and `no' at the same time.These paradoxicals come on their own through the medium of instincts and Hegel, it seems, hardly reversed his `urges' though they were kept as negative moments of dialectic.There are other instances of psychic life that brings out the simple naivete.Unlike Egyptians who saw language and words emanating from God's mouth, Hegel was earthier who figured language acquisition as belonging to spontaneous mental growth.

However, I would be cautious about mentioning the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in comparative terms with PdG and WL.I know this may sound trite but not without its worth to state the only other book that Hegel wrote was Wissenschaft Logik[WL]. Given this standard of comparison, the only justification for inveighing PhS over Science of Logic could only be due to refractive and/or ethereal affect.The importance of Science of Logic over PhS lies in the realm of cognition or Philosophy as such. Phenomenology of Spirit, or the study of opposing consciousness [ subject-object to subject-subject relations]is presupposed in Science of Logic, which elaborates the method proper to philosophy as science.The method of Philosophy lies in its being freed from oppositions of consciousness showing up in the phenomenal worlds, which is quiet different from `freeing the mind from misconceptions'.

If Kai means by Hegel's Phenomenology a "ladder", <<comparable maybe to Wittgenstein's own rendering of Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus>>,"because Philosophy does not start from the blue", that would fall in an area of deep-seated disputation. For one,PhD has a definite point of departure, the beginning, so to speak, in sense-experience.

The first chapter of Phenomenology is the world of immediate experience and all the subsequent phenomenologies,beginning with Brentano-Husserl have `experience' as constituting the substrata of their analysis.Second, the metaphor `ladder' can also be thrown away after climbing the last step, as suggested by Wittgenstein. Here, Kai does not provide the consequential logic of the `ladder'; should it be kept, internalized or thrown away, externalized or what? The formulation also begets answer to the question why didn't Hegel extend whatever he did write in PhS into his earlier piece titled Philosophie der Geistes'?

Moreover, one cannot overlook the transition problem of moving from `here' to `there' while moving from Phenomenology to Philosophy.In Encyclopedia Logik,Hegel puts Phenomenology between Anthropology as the presupposed part and Psychology as the following part.All the three subjects - Anthropology, Phenomenology and Psychology- came under Philosophy.

Kai's `talk' self-negates, if not his own construct but certainly a construct that says 1)it is not necessary to read and get stuck up in the Preface to PdG before/after reading the main body of the text and 2]that PhS is not necessary for `grasping' anything that Hegel wrote afterwords, his system, if'Philosophie der Geistes, 1803-'04,The Jena System, 1804-'05 and Jena Realphilosophie, 1805-'06 is read.The argument is that in these writings all that was hurriedly written by Hegel had already been covered up in the earlier writings where, moreover, the subjects - logic, nature,spirit/mind/history/aesthetics - make a better template for reading all that Hegel wrote after PhS.Kai sees PhS as a work that systematically includes [`sublated']"all reasonable perspectives from all philosophers before him" and none of these philosophers used Phenomenology to teach and come to conclusions.This is a strange thing to say. It amounts to denying a breakthrough in the domain of philosophy to Hegel. I mean even somebody like Charles S Pierce says that Hegel was the first modern Realist philosopher while others had been nominalists.

CLARIFYING PHENOMENOLOGY

Why was this the case ? Does it make Hegel's PhS a work of some maverick? As a matter of fact, Hegel viewed Kant's philosophy very close to a phenomenology for giving a theory of consciousness from the appearance of the subject to an object but, as usual, could not push through the concept that would show the truth of the said relation for he could not go beyond appearances. Actually this a-symmetry of Kant's thought has been pointed out repeatedly by Hegel too many times.At any rate, Hegel pushes the argument not just in terms of the shapes of subject-object relations in the experiencing consciousness but goes much further on the direction of positing the truths of all relations, including self-relations, thereby negating the aporias of Kant.


In the realm of philosophy, Hegel observed that with Kant, `consciousness' was "essentially a property", not as the abstract of `ordinary consciousness', but as a derivative property of the transcendental a a priori,i.e.the rules governing our knowledge.Kant will regard such properties as `mental representations', which if anything, are our own.Only in the 20th c. did Sohn-Rethel, who studied Kant under Heidegger, considered grounding the Kantian a priori of transcendental in the reality of the socially abstract commodity world from a Marxist perspective.But this is relative verification, which is not what Kant suggested.

Hegel proposed Geistes/ Spirit, as Mind such as understood by Alcemeon of Creaton [500-450 B C], the ancient Greek writer on medicine, who was the first to discover the brain as the seat and power, understanding and perception in a harmonious united in mind, or, possessing the power to equalize opposites <wet/dry; hot/cold;sweet/bitter, etc.>, which he designated by the use of the original term for democracy, i.e., isonomia.

Hegel could derive speculatively that this Mind <brain> was not stuck up or submerged either in nature or reflection/representation, but has the power to raise itself in increasing degrees, like inspiration, from conventions, blind faith, superstitions so as to unite the single consciousness with the real, vital feelings animating the community.Such "indwelling spirit of community", the prius of Geistes emerging as a co-relate, or consciousness that is on-and-for-itself would both subordinate and transform, aufhaben/sublate by exposition of laws expressing relations of subordinate-mutual reciprocity in the commons [of life]. This would be the Spirit/Geistes having suspended its subjective nature of consciousness.

REVISITING HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY DER GEISTES

Kai also considers the conservative construct, mostly those who are inclined towards reading Hegel in a theological sense.Even if almost all of their positions are granted, I would insist why is it compulsive for them to omit the Preface? The Preface is no configuration for what Hegel wrote later.I think that what Hegel says about the truth as the Bacchic ravel the choreographic moment of the rose in the cross, does not sit comfortably with the theologians. But then, even in terms of theology, Christians do not have any monopoly over Hegel on the subject.

On the other hand, the analytical, neo-Kantian, `phenomenological' and positivist/empiricist thinker would also prefer to dispense with the Preface because of the manner of Hegel's break with Descartes, identity logic and the self-certain Ego as the I, when "I say `I', this singular `I', I say in general all `I's'; everyone is what I say, everyone is `I' the singular" [ 'PdG', 83].However, the sense of it can be felt by radicalized souls who see 'PdG' as a book that constitutes a ‎break with previous philosophies in the same way that Heraclitus' systemic notion marked a ‎revolutionary moment in the history of philosophy, according to Hegel.

In addition, many philologists would also join the bandwagon because of anomalies in language and the spontaneous, `stream of consciousness' type writing that may be found there.However, the anomalous part belongs very much to the discourse of Grammarians ever since the days when the school of Alexandria flourished, and it is not possible to write on consciousness without giving its own streaming automatic flow the requisite due.

Other than this ,to wit, points 7-10 made by Kai are well accepted. As a matter of fact they just go on to show the congruence between the `structure ' of PdG and Hegel's later system.

To begin with the production side of the first book on Phenomenology, the `Geistes'/Spirits was part of the first, original title covering around 750 pages in all, the number of pages being equivalent to the number of copies released in April 1807 and published by J Hoffmeister in Bamberg.Hegel reached there in Jan. 1807, remained preoccupied with the book-release in April, 1807.Other than proof reading, because proofing-cum-typesetting-cum-formatting constituted the last stage of publication, self-proofing of handwritten pages by the author must have been made clear, edited, copy-edited, details from contents, written matter for Hoffmeister the publisher, due to Hegel's involvement.

It was in that period,from January winters, 1807, that he wrote the Preface.Almost the entire book seems written straight, on the singular plane that makes writing a volitional and responsible deed, without too much, rather minimalist reworking of drafts.

The thinking that lead to the book, however,covered at least five years prior to its writing.Hegel had prided' himself for having "predicted the entire upheaval", the revolution in France, and the book "completed the night before the battle of Jena" makes the dramatic point of intersection where the abstract freedom of French republic " passes out of its own self-destructive activity over to another land" that would be Germany.< Letter to Naithammer, Apr. 29, 1814>Jena,for Hegel was this apparent,visible passage of self-consciousness for truth awaiting `refreshment' while remaining in thought, from `the brown rivulet of coffee' and original `Rhine wine'.This event had to mark and impress the discovery, not recovery,of Phenomenology of Spirit as the novel beginning the ending of via moderna.

It should be kept in mind that given that there was hardly any philosopher who had identified herself with philosophy as much as Hegel.Sometimes the identification bets so personal and completed that philosophy seems to become an euphemism for the use of `I' by Hegel in certain contexts, by pitching himself as identical with philosophy.

Hegel saw a philosophical calling before the world historical spirit and this was resolved by announcing the new born as Phenomenology, as (an already) absolute self-consciousness. The main body comprised in the working of the way by the use of a revolutionary method of the knowledge that knows itself both in a non-exoteric unity.

The spirit of the age seen as Napoleon,as the external appearance was destined to get recognized by Hegel for `aufheben'/sublation of all that preceded the arrival of this absolute Spirit,of man as man, at Golgotha, as that level of the brim beyond which the froth spills over.The inner, philosophical engagement and dialoguing with Christianity as religion and spending of long periods of time with Christ would also terminate in a Phenomenology whose contents,the becoming encompassed by consciousness resulted in a Spirit/`Geist,which was absolutely adequate for Philosophy that had sublated/`aufheben Religion.

This needs to be restated somewhat axiomatically, on the diagonal that without the appearance of the in-and-for-itself moment there would not have been a Phenomenology that would have united the diachronic and the synchronous, the latter prescencing [presenting itself]/``Darstellungen',or in the dramatic progression/procession of consciousness from experience to perception to understanding and force.The orientation and thinking of all that appears before consciousness is posited dynamically.After exposition of the main structure of neoma < the invisibility of consciousness> consciousness moves to the diachronic plane, i.e., self-consciousness.

CONTENTS

Self-consciousness is the activity of knowledge of its truth after having grasped the truths of of sense-certainty, beginning the arche of desire that exceeds the appetative/appetizing object as desired,which appears in the field of perception-that finds its truth in `recognition', the terrain where desire is consummated through the dialectic of lordship and bondage prescencing with force, as a fight unto death between two embodiments of consciousness.The fight is a metaphor, a ruse of reason because one embodied consciousness submits to `recognizing' because the submitted consciousness knows in advance that its truth can only be constituted in the diachronic through work/labour/production, as unfolding by production of time,the knowledge that the present can only become dialectical, as becoming,opposed to the eternal, fixed knowing of the recognized consciousness, only by the effect of the future on the present since each such moment of actualization marks the road to freedom.

Freedom starts in the interiority at first, but whenever the opposition externalizes through combats, interiority too externalizes itself as expansive, multiple units of the self. Thus the self that returns back into its indwelling site after the combat is an enriched self that can only progress concretely whenever the action of the future - the time to be made- is universal.In other words,the free self-activity of recognizing consciousness sublates/`aufheben fixed, constant, eternal knowledge of recognized consciousness. In terms of a dialectical procession that consciousness progresses, which makes the truth of freedom as universal, a moment that cannot be grasped by the recognized consciousness even though it learns about freedom by a limited unity with its other. The limits are the one's that it has already realized in the first two moments of individuality [ in desire]and particularity [of recognition by the other].

Hegel's `Phenomenology of Spirit/s' was seen as a journey through a picture gallery later on by Hegel himself and this gallery turns out to be a vision-in-the-making as we move from conceptualizing one picture, as mental image,to another conceptualization to yet another and in this sense Phenomenology is linked to earlier traditions their initial glimmerings may be found in Plato,marking the great moment in Greek ontology where conceptions/`ennoiai of genera and species/ ''`ennoimeta end up in thoughts/`noemaas concepts/`'en-noema. Plato introduces these themes and in the course of dialogues the difficulties of the themata emerge prominently instead of resolutions. Aristotle appealed to internal representations or fractals of Plato's `noemaas a resolution and this was contradicted by Stoical arguments on non-existent representations of thought-objects.


Later Stoics used propositional and semantic logic applied to entities/`ens'.Shifted to the ontological terrain, that had already been made problematical by Plato but remained suppressed through philology though in Latin the cognates of `intentio were interpreted variously by Sextus Empiricus,Diogenes Leaterus and most prominently, Zeno of Cleanthes.`Intentio had different meanings though as the two-fold division between mental state and mental acts clarified the terms of references.Early Arabic philosophy referred to terms such as `ma'naand `ma'qul mean more like `mood' of soul as it occurs in Indian philosophical term,`mana and mental acts that had more to do with practical, `to do' of ontology instead of pure mental states , thought-objects that were self-generating and not as they were mentioned in religious scriptures.

SHAPES

Hegel saw these excursions, except for Plato's conceptions and ma'na, as a mood of the soul, as so many pseudo philosophical inanities that had to be cleared.

PhS is mainly an exposition of reason. Since self-consciousness is reason ` since what had been the negative relation to otherness turns out to be a positive relation' . Reason is the certainty that consciousness has of being all reality. [PhS # 232]

Reason reaches the most critical, spiritless and terrifying point when it assumes the shape of abstract universal freedom when all being of self is emptied into non-being. Subjectivity turns into something like an empty object when thought becomes so bad that ` it becomes difficult to say exactly where the badness lies.[PhS # 340]. This is what happens during French revolution when `the general will' took on the shape of abstract universality of freedom that used virtue leading to suspicion for universal terror with human heds coming under the Guillotine like `cabbages under kitchen knife'. `Feurie des Verschnwadens'is the description provided by Hegel to show the culminated act of revolution. With this act, the logic of the revolution turned into its opposite, from the dialectical logic it turned into sheer abstraction, or abstract freedom that was unmediated in the act of Terror dissolved all the earlier promises and determinations, turning the intellectual landscape into a barren desert. It is only at this point that the Spirit falls, turns into abyss, into meaninglessness and consequently, meaningless death.

The destabilization of the dialectic by abstract unmediated negativity of universal freedom would face revolt from `observing instinct of self-conscious reason' in the principle of individual freedom or the opposition between universal liberty as embodied by the state and the individual liberty that was the principle of liberalism.


PhS may also be seen as transformation of preconscious to the fully developed form of consciousness is also in addition to the discovery, creating a product [eidos], or idea-product though work is a mark of general, social labour, which is what makes the `we' in Hegel's philosophy..When Hegel worked out the path to write Phenomenology, Kai is correct in tracing its genealogy to 1801-'02, the organization of that, as demanded by cumulative non-quantified logic, in 1806 did not qualify as Phenomenology to Hegel.However one should not infer that Phenomenology is something of an advance from Philosophy. There is a difference and an opposition resulting in subordination of Phenomenology to Logic or the method proper to Philosophy.

AESTHETICS

Resemblances are and should be deceptive, fully recognized as intrinsic to aesthetics. But in Philosophy, where the right word may be `meme' [ contentious terrain for sure], yet all such acts remain subordinate to the concept [begriff],when the world is actively involved, as with prayers,with the `Enlightenment Idea' about opinion [doxa]governing the world.In terms of dialectic Hegel broke a barrier of linearity and the work of 1807 was preceded by a leap that could only be found in the Preface where Hegel shows the destabilizing nature of truth as the ravel.

To round up what is being said, there is the difference between Hegel's perception of the product of his labours [and the use of `we' by Hegel contains others in the course of work]and the perception of social labour that produced 750 copies. If that is self-evident then the next unity must be the dynamic unity of these two modes of work and perception all the way to the moment of absolute synthetic, non-oppositional/oppositional, non-differentiated/differentiated unity.That would be the work of Spirit.

Lastly‎, PhS was very much spurred by the 18th c. notion of Education as articulated by Diderot, Voltaire , even Helvetius, Condillac as much as the influence of Hölderlin. I think that the so-called break up between Hegel and Holderlin as caused by latter's failed attempt to assassinate a Guiltier or some political notable has been overstressed. In fact, Holderlin had already retreated to a big depression after his wife's early death leading to madness of a kind. In  a letter to Hegel, Holderlin had made a critique of Fichte's `absolute spirit', which encompassed all reality, resembling post-modern blabber on the absence of any outside.Holderlin made clear that without the object self-consciousness was impossible and without consciousness `I am for myself nothing; absolute self is nothing for me. Hölderlin imparted the notion of Bildung [ popular education] to Geistes. As he wrote to Schelling:" Poetry made me contemplate the Bildung, the formation of character and impulse for improvement.Consciousness of its ground and essence in Geistes/Spirit" provided the material to instinctively inspire him to draft a humanistic journal including poetry.

Hölderlin sought how to make the transition from prose to poetry and, with it, the transience of the body.