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Revelance of Hegel's Jena Phenomenology

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The subject of this talk started as a response to Kai Froeb's `Is the Phenomenology needed or recommended as introduction to Hegel's System.'After scribbling palimpsest jotting primitives to approximate the opening chapter of Hegel's Phenomenology,[PhS, hereafter] it was clear that starting with pure immediacy as indicated by `this', `what',`that', not-this, not what',`not-that' were all simply abstract in a twofold character. The moment this' is uttered about any smell or sound it is as immediate for senses as the passage to `not-this' as that moves away sooner than a blink by another immediacy.This is like the flow of time.In language, to say `this is' would already grant a movement to the `is'as something more or less of `that'.

There are no suppositions, like axioms or knowledge required at all to say `this'. For reason the being that is `this' is as simple an abstraction as its nothing,`not-this'.There is no relation between them. Each this is equally non-this, which makes a unity;the fluidity in the immediate passage of the not-this to the this is an equal unity.None are true even as facts for they are not separate things.Saying that `nothing is' is ridiculous for senses but that is not so for reason.Reason grasps that nothing is that escapes senses. What is true can only be for reason and that takes effort by reason to raise these simple unities to a level when the flux can be perceived. Hegel's phenomenology is not any `first philosophy'. As a first, the truth of sense is untrue. Only when its unities are raised to a higher region do we arrive at the truth of self-certainty. But the level of perception can only have the truth by removing the immediacy of senses. Perception preserves sense-experience by annulling its immediacy without annihilating it.The term `sublate' means to preserve/keep the predecessor as a negative, as mediation.

Sense-experience is explored as  simple immediacy. These get negated by the consciousness, which is in motion due to the simulation and excitation of the senses on Mind. The truths of sense-certainty are posited empirically; they are facts of consciousness. What is, is not and what is not, is.

The `dialectic of sense-certainty' like natural consciousness is the `simple history of its movement.[ Ref. Pinkard, Terry, Phenomenology of Mind', Zusatz,109, put in single quotes] What is learnt from experience is easily forgotten and erroneous sequences repeat themselves. Through the medium of consciousness, reason makes the simple abstraction that in this truth of experience lies the truth all of experiences.Yet the very vastness of experience coming and ceasing in the abyss of duration cannot be enveloped by perception and reason.Like the first contact that initiates by opening a dimension this is invisible, that is when reason steps in not to designate the invisible as absolute as to establish the level of perception that sustains the visible of sense experience. For consciousness there opens up the dimension of interiority as the condition for sustaining the ground of possibility including contingency.We begin by opposing the argument that seeks agreement on the empirical presence of nothing can be experienced by sense-experience for establishing the truth about sensuous things.

Even animals are aware of the `mystery of bread and wine' as the simple negative that is celebrated by the whole of nature.It is not the difference or the opposition of being and non-being. Only in perception is nothing the condition for any determinate.Now the reception of being passes the the action of negative into the phenomenal world. The plenitude of being in world resulting from original mediation leads to the self relation of negative by splitting/saundering to retreat/withdraw into interiority as the essence of separate and manifold phenomenon.The determinate nothing is inverted appearance,showing like `doubled sublation', as unknown. It is conceptualized as an abstraction, which again is the medium for `thinghood'. The essence, as self-alienating is posited in consciousness as `contradictory'.However, conditions for dialectic shows up in the clearing as consciousness reflects on it to register a transformation of movement to development, e.g., the singular unity of things are now a multiplicity and diversity.

What is said in the first two sections of PhS is a mode of sublation externalizing what gets preserved open to external influences and that which was caused to cease or ended would be the neomatic curvature resembling non-linear "movement of returning back to itself, reflection into self or a self-relation of inner time-dialectic. By now the break with Kant's aporias, antinomies is crystal clear.

At any rate, going by the history of acceptance of Hegel's texts/books, Jena Phenomenology has possibly been accepted and even read much more than any other text/transcriptions/books at least in the previous century. Only the Philosophy of Right carries the possibility of outstripping the Phenomenology but the latter is farthest from being a work that may serve as an introduction to Hegel's system.It may not be as easily included in university `reading lists' except in the margins that would be due to the fact that it is not an easy book to teach from the lectern or pulpit and nor was the book really written for reading in universities. Thus while in the universities phenomenology is taught exclusively as a branch of philosophy, Hegel's presence would be very marginal. That need not have been so.PhS can be seen to exceed being a book for introduction to Hegel's systematic philosophy for reasons such as : a] as the first book of phenomenology, it is breathtaking in its coverage and scope; b] it is a lively exposition pulsating with the dialectic as a method of movement, `that is the method of science' with infinite potentiality; c] the dialectic is shown to work as an organizing principle of scientific exposition;d]almost all the concepts of his system prefigure with considerable clarity in PhS; e] teaches critical method in the movement from one field to the next with precision and economy of thought;f] takes up all the subjects of the system from logic,speculative philosophy, world history, ethics,aesthetics, politics, law, morals and right,religion,ontology,phenomenology as science of knowledge,philosophers philosophies and psychology/philosophy of mind in terms of the notion/concept as a beginning and unfolding;g]data structures of history are bereft of their individuality and shown to belong to the movement of self-consciousness involving high level of enquiry for making comparisons, to show the truth of historical `facts' by links of reason even where the results are no dramatic remaining `unadorned' perhaps why there is a definite historical intuition over and above references at work;h]as a book standing on its own not for reasons of any `system' but in the anti-systemic sense. It may be suggested that just a reading of PhS and Science of logic together with his the Philosophy of Right is already more than enough material for grasping his philosophy in both ways : systematically and anti-systematically.

To even search for a introduction to any system, per see elicits a standard response which displaces the question in a way close to Kant turning away from his own efforts that had the `infinite merit' of restoring what were the central principles of philosophy, - ontology, synthetic/analytic judgments,the laws of identity and difference,consciousness, dialectic and speculative philosophy above all. Kant sees in the consciousness which gives shape to reason out of the materials available in specific times as the unknown and unknowable. Instead of pushing the activity of immanent Reason from consciousness in the `objective' world that is identical with the subject that would have produced a phenomenology, Kant is seen by Hegel as `betraying' the principles that makes philosophy possible by surrendering Reason to Understanding, transforming the infinite meditations of consciousness that is active in the real world to the unknowable, Kant makes the manifold world of unfolding appearances, which may have been mediated by the derived essence of speculative philosophy into an abstraction or makes abstraction as the ultimate generalization.An abstraction of this order of magnitude provides the illusion of being reason, which makes reason as something finite.The opposition of phenomena to noumea that Kant makes central, since even the structure of nouemata is hardly an advance from Aristotle whereas the veil of mystical < secret kind of knowing> after reaching the limits of understanding, Kant begins to talk about the fallibility , defect, lack, deficiency of human cognition, activity of thinking. But the demands of infinity that lingers from the original moment when the principle got formulated though later transformed and justified as a priori and further as the unity of a perception. Turning to the side of subject, subjectivity, etc, Kant makes that to be the active side that wills, aims towards actualizing the ends of moral-ethical order like the ceaseless activity of what he calls `ought'. Yet there emerges once again the inability, activity that has within itself some shortcoming or defect which becomes like a wall or a barrier, eliminating the possibility for identity with the end.

Instead of the  ought that is also an out-and-out positivity , Kant factors the transcendental as the basic property any subject's consciousness. In a self-alienated, estranged and sundered world whose reflection's are Kantian antimony, Hegel credits Fichte for remaining or holding truly to the speculative principle by keeping the the subject-object identity right till the end though the initial I=I type identity was used with enthusiasm, towards the closing part of his system the said principle gets stressed and strained when Fichte returns to Kant for taking up the ought as providing proof for his identity logic in a one sided manner that forgets the simple opposite of any `ought', namely while it is possible for ought to reach as close as possible to the sublime `world', it is equally true for the ought that fails to come anywhere close to the said proximal.If something can be done then what remains of the positivity if it cannot be done? Thus the ought contains a strong , irreconcilable opposition within itself, which Fichte attempts to resolve by making the object as conditioned by the subject through relations though  conditioning  of the object does not eliminate autonomous self-identity of the object. 

Hegel was an astute reader, extraordinarily gifted by nature that freed him from innocence and misunderstanding.The all-too-human modesty of Hegel has often been interpreted as his conservative side that weighed heavier than the revolutionary side of dialectic by someone as perceptive of German philosophy like Engels. The two main concerns of Hegel in his lifetime was religion/church and state/despotism. During his youth Hegel was openly talking about the church that practices the despotism of the state and by the close of his lifetime, the interactivity between these two oppressive institutions wee such that Germany was stuck up in a morass of semi-feudalism. Following from this concern, Hegel's legacy was immediately political after the initial theological spurt.PhS can be read as a cummulum of that move.A metaphor of a ladder may be conjured up in order to `climb from PhS to Science of logic and after that the ladder may well be away. As instances of what he thought that was put to writing then what Hegel wrote are perhaps closest to authenticate his cognition, method and orientation while they may be more difficult to grasp as fast as his transcribed lecture notes.

Consciousness meant something vastly different than Kant and Fichte. The philosophy of his age arose from the need that conditions created such as estrangement, oppositions and prevalent antagonisms in civil society. Rather than being a possession qualified subjectively as it was with Kant and the unresolved diremption in Fichte's self-identity whose habitat, pure consciousness could not stay as though solipsistic ally. Hegel countered Fichte by showing the real site of consciousness as the restless indwelling spirit in terms of individuality and as the indwelling spirit of community throbbing with life and inconceivable as standing apart from the `sociality of reason'.However, in either realm consciousness would be embodied and opposed to itself, as self-alienation.PhG is the work of time producing shapes of opposing consciousness, which get reconciled in a time line considered in epochal terms.These shapes are shown to emerge in various cultures as aesthetics that religion creates.Further it is relevant to keep in mind facts such as Hegel suspending the ontological meaning of ethical life and politics by 1803-4.The very absence of consciousness by Aristotle, who emphasized the course of natural teleology was sufficient to move away fro Aristotle. Aristotle is suspended in the same way that religion and God had been taken out of the History of Philosophy.

This response is sensitive to historical contexts, durations and time especially when the subject is Hegel, whose life mysteriously co-coincided with historical drifts.

There is no dispute that the aftermath of PhS casts a shadow on Hegel's post-Jena work.Its opaque effect that befalls any reader in these times pertains to the language of PhS.It is thought that speaks to itself and equally listens, which arranges density, clears confusions in the manner of the incipient language of early Greek philosophy, rich in phonetic attributes through utterance.Hegel brings philosophers of antiquity up to date.Truths uttered 2500 years ago by philosophy remain truths as of now and well into the future.He deploys a fair amount of native dialects and vernacular traditions that may be unrefined and even clumsy when ordered grammatically.Urges and instinct are more than ambivalent when they end up saying `yes' and `no' at the same time.These paradoxicals come on their own through the medium of instincts and Hegel, it seems, hardly reversed his `urges' though they were kept as negative moments of dialectic.There are other instances of psychic life that brings out the simple naivete.Unlike Egyptians who saw language and words emanating from God's mouth, Hegel was earthier who figured language acquisition as belonging to spontaneous mental growth.

However, I would be cautious about mentioning the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in comparative terms with PdG and WL.I know this may sound trite but not without its worth to state the only other book that Hegel wrote was Wissenschaft Logik[WL]. Given this standard of comparison, the only justification for inveighing PhS over Science of Logic could only be due to refractive and/or ethereal affect.The importance of Science of Logic over PhS lies in the realm of cognition or Philosophy as such. Phenomenology of Spirit, or the study of opposing consciousness [ subject-object to subject-subject relations]is presupposed in Science of Logic, which elaborates the method proper to philosophy as science.The method of Philosophy lies in its being freed from oppositions of consciousness showing up in the phenomenal worlds, which is quiet different from `freeing the mind from misconceptions'.

If Kai means by Hegel's Phenomenology a "ladder", <<comparable maybe to Wittgenstein's own rendering of Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus>>,"because Philosophy does not start from the blue", that would fall in an area of deep-seated disputation. For one,PhD has a definite point of departure, the beginning, so to speak, in sense-experience.

The first chapter of Phenomenology is the world of immediate experience and all the subsequent phenomenologies,beginning with Brentano-Husserl have `experience' as constituting the substrata of their analysis.Second, the metaphor `ladder' can also be thrown away after climbing the last step, as suggested by Wittgenstein. Here, Kai does not provide the consequential logic of the `ladder'; should it be kept, internalized or thrown away, externalized or what? The formulation also begets answer to the question why didn't Hegel extend whatever he did write in PhS into his earlier piece titled Philosophie der Geistes'?

Moreover, one cannot overlook the transition problem of moving from `here' to `there' while moving from Phenomenology to Philosophy.In Encyclopedia Logik,Hegel puts Phenomenology between Anthropology as the presupposed part and Psychology as the following part.All the three subjects - Anthropology, Phenomenology and Psychology- came under Philosophy.

Kai's `talk' self-negates, if not his own construct but certainly a construct that says 1)it is not necessary to read and get stuck up in the Preface to PdG before/after reading the main body of the text and 2]that PhS is not necessary for `grasping' anything that Hegel wrote afterwords, his system, if'Philosophie der Geistes, 1803-'04,The Jena System, 1804-'05 and Jena Realphilosophie, 1805-'06 is read.The argument is that in these writings all that was hurriedly written by Hegel had already been covered up in the earlier writings where, moreover, the subjects - logic, nature,spirit/mind/history/aesthetics - make a better template for reading all that Hegel wrote after PhS.Kai sees PhS as a work that systematically includes [`sublated']"all reasonable perspectives from all philosophers before him" and none of these philosophers used Phenomenology to teach and come to conclusions.This is a strange thing to say. It amounts to denying a breakthrough in the domain of philosophy to Hegel. I mean even somebody like Charles S Pierce says that Hegel was the first modern Realist philosopher while others had been nominalists.


Why was this the case ? Does it make Hegel's PhS a work of some maverick? As a matter of fact, Hegel viewed Kant's philosophy very close to a phenomenology for giving a theory of consciousness from the appearance of the subject to an object but, as usual, could not push through the concept that would show the truth of the said relation for he could not go beyond appearances. Actually this a-symmetry of Kant's thought has been pointed out repeatedly by Hegel too many times.At any rate, Hegel pushes the argument not just in terms of the shapes of subject-object relations in the experiencing consciousness but goes much further on the direction of positing the truths of all relations, including self-relations, thereby negating the aporias of Kant.

In the realm of philosophy, Hegel observed that with Kant, `consciousness' was "essentially a property", not as the abstract of `ordinary consciousness', but as a derivative property of the transcendental a a priori,i.e.the rules governing our knowledge.Kant will regard such properties as `mental representations', which if anything, are our own.Only in the 20th c. did Sohn-Rethel, who studied Kant under Heidegger, considered grounding the Kantian a priori of transcendental in the reality of the socially abstract commodity world from a Marxist perspective.But this is relative verification, which is not what Kant suggested.

Hegel proposed Geistes/ Spirit, as Mind such as understood by Alcemeon of Creaton [500-450 B C], the ancient Greek writer on medicine, who was the first to discover the brain as the seat and power, understanding and perception in a harmonious united in mind, or, possessing the power to equalize opposites <wet/dry; hot/cold;sweet/bitter, etc.>, which he designated by the use of the original term for democracy, i.e., isonomia.

Hegel could derive speculatively that this Mind <brain> was not stuck up or submerged either in nature or reflection/representation, but has the power to raise itself in increasing degrees, like inspiration, from conventions, blind faith, superstitions so as to unite the single consciousness with the real, vital feelings animating the community.Such "indwelling spirit of community", the prius of Geistes emerging as a co-relate, or consciousness that is on-and-for-itself would both subordinate and transform, aufhaben/sublate by exposition of laws expressing relations of subordinate-mutual reciprocity in the commons [of life]. This would be the Spirit/Geistes having suspended its subjective nature of consciousness.


Kai also considers the conservative construct, mostly those who are inclined towards reading Hegel in a theological sense.Even if almost all of their positions are granted, I would insist why is it compulsive for them to omit the Preface? The Preface is no configuration for what Hegel wrote later.I think that what Hegel says about the truth as the Bacchic ravel the choreographic moment of the rose in the cross, does not sit comfortably with the theologians. But then, even in terms of theology, Christians do not have any monopoly over Hegel on the subject.

On the other hand, the analytical, neo-Kantian, `phenomenological' and positivist/empiricist thinker would also prefer to dispense with the Preface because of the manner of Hegel's break with Descartes, identity logic and the self-certain Ego as the I, when "I say `I', this singular `I', I say in general all `I's'; everyone is what I say, everyone is `I' the singular" [ 'PdG', 83].However, the sense of it can be felt by radicalized souls who see 'PdG' as a book that constitutes a ‎break with previous philosophies in the same way that Heraclitus' systemic notion marked a ‎revolutionary moment in the history of philosophy, according to Hegel.

In addition, many philologists would also join the bandwagon because of anomalies in language and the spontaneous, `stream of consciousness' type writing that may be found there.However, the anomalous part belongs very much to the discourse of Grammarians ever since the days when the school of Alexandria flourished, and it is not possible to write on consciousness without giving its own streaming automatic flow the requisite due.

Other than this ,to wit, points 7-10 made by Kai are well accepted. As a matter of fact they just go on to show the congruence between the `structure ' of PdG and Hegel's later system.

To begin with the production side of the first book on Phenomenology, the `Geistes'/Spirits was part of the first, original title covering around 750 pages in all, the number of pages being equivalent to the number of copies released in April 1807 and published by J Hoffmeister in Bamberg.Hegel reached there in Jan. 1807, remained preoccupied with the book-release in April, 1807.Other than proof reading, because proofing-cum-typesetting-cum-formatting constituted the last stage of publication, self-proofing of handwritten pages by the author must have been made clear, edited, copy-edited, details from contents, written matter for Hoffmeister the publisher, due to Hegel's involvement.

It was in that period,from January winters, 1807, that he wrote the Preface.Almost the entire book seems written straight, on the singular plane that makes writing a volitional and responsible deed, without too much, rather minimalist reworking of drafts.

The thinking that lead to the book, however,covered at least five years prior to its writing.Hegel had prided' himself for having "predicted the entire upheaval", the revolution in France, and the book "completed the night before the battle of Jena" makes the dramatic point of intersection where the abstract freedom of French republic " passes out of its own self-destructive activity over to another land" that would be Germany.< Letter to Naithammer, Apr. 29, 1814>Jena,for Hegel was this apparent,visible passage of self-consciousness for truth awaiting `refreshment' while remaining in thought, from `the brown rivulet of coffee' and original `Rhine wine'.This event had to mark and impress the discovery, not recovery,of Phenomenology of Spirit as the novel beginning the ending of via moderna.

It should be kept in mind that given that there was hardly any philosopher who had identified herself with philosophy as much as Hegel.Sometimes the identification bets so personal and completed that philosophy seems to become an euphemism for the use of `I' by Hegel in certain contexts, by pitching himself as identical with philosophy.

Hegel saw a philosophical calling before the world historical spirit and this was resolved by announcing the new born as Phenomenology, as (an already) absolute self-consciousness. The main body comprised in the working of the way by the use of a revolutionary method of the knowledge that knows itself both in a non-exoteric unity.

The spirit of the age seen as Napoleon,as the external appearance was destined to get recognized by Hegel for `aufheben'/sublation of all that preceded the arrival of this absolute Spirit,of man as man, at Golgotha, as that level of the brim beyond which the froth spills over.The inner, philosophical engagement and dialoguing with Christianity as religion and spending of long periods of time with Christ would also terminate in a Phenomenology whose contents,the becoming encompassed by consciousness resulted in a Spirit/`Geist,which was absolutely adequate for Philosophy that had sublated/`aufheben Religion.

This needs to be restated somewhat axiomatically, on the diagonal that without the appearance of the in-and-for-itself moment there would not have been a Phenomenology that would have united the diachronic and the synchronous, the latter prescencing [presenting itself]/``Darstellungen',or in the dramatic progression/procession of consciousness from experience to perception to understanding and force.The orientation and thinking of all that appears before consciousness is posited dynamically.After exposition of the main structure of neoma < the invisibility of consciousness> consciousness moves to the diachronic plane, i.e., self-consciousness.


Self-consciousness is the activity of knowledge of its truth after having grasped the truths of of sense-certainty, beginning the arche of desire that exceeds the appetative/appetizing object as desired,which appears in the field of perception-that finds its truth in `recognition', the terrain where desire is consummated through the dialectic of lordship and bondage prescencing with force, as a fight unto death between two embodiments of consciousness.The fight is a metaphor, a ruse of reason because one embodied consciousness submits to `recognizing' because the submitted consciousness knows in advance that its truth can only be constituted in the diachronic through work/labour/production, as unfolding by production of time,the knowledge that the present can only become dialectical, as becoming,opposed to the eternal, fixed knowing of the recognized consciousness, only by the effect of the future on the present since each such moment of actualization marks the road to freedom.

Freedom starts in the interiority at first, but whenever the opposition externalizes through combats, interiority too externalizes itself as expansive, multiple units of the self. Thus the self that returns back into its indwelling site after the combat is an enriched self that can only progress concretely whenever the action of the future - the time to be made- is universal.In other words,the free self-activity of recognizing consciousness sublates/`aufheben fixed, constant, eternal knowledge of recognized consciousness. In terms of a dialectical procession that consciousness progresses, which makes the truth of freedom as universal, a moment that cannot be grasped by the recognized consciousness even though it learns about freedom by a limited unity with its other. The limits are the one's that it has already realized in the first two moments of individuality [ in desire]and particularity [of recognition by the other].

Hegel's `Phenomenology of Spirit/s' was seen as a journey through a picture gallery later on by Hegel himself and this gallery turns out to be a vision-in-the-making as we move from conceptualizing one picture, as mental image,to another conceptualization to yet another and in this sense Phenomenology is linked to earlier traditions their initial glimmerings may be found in Plato,marking the great moment in Greek ontology where conceptions/`ennoiai of genera and species/ ''`ennoimeta end up in thoughts/`noemaas concepts/`'en-noema. Plato introduces these themes and in the course of dialogues the difficulties of the themata emerge prominently instead of resolutions. Aristotle appealed to internal representations or fractals of Plato's `noemaas a resolution and this was contradicted by Stoical arguments on non-existent representations of thought-objects.

Later Stoics used propositional and semantic logic applied to entities/`ens'.Shifted to the ontological terrain, that had already been made problematical by Plato but remained suppressed through philology though in Latin the cognates of `intentio were interpreted variously by Sextus Empiricus,Diogenes Leaterus and most prominently, Zeno of Cleanthes.`Intentio had different meanings though as the two-fold division between mental state and mental acts clarified the terms of references.Early Arabic philosophy referred to terms such as `ma'naand `ma'qul mean more like `mood' of soul as it occurs in Indian philosophical term,`mana and mental acts that had more to do with practical, `to do' of ontology instead of pure mental states , thought-objects that were self-generating and not as they were mentioned in religious scriptures.


Hegel saw these excursions, except for Plato's conceptions and ma'na, as a mood of the soul, as so many pseudo philosophical inanities that had to be cleared.

PhS is mainly an exposition of reason. Since self-consciousness is reason ` since what had been the negative relation to otherness turns out to be a positive relation' . Reason is the certainty that consciousness has of being all reality. [PhS # 232]

Reason reaches the most critical, spiritless and terrifying point when it assumes the shape of abstract universal freedom when all being of self is emptied into non-being. Subjectivity turns into something like an empty object when thought becomes so bad that ` it becomes difficult to say exactly where the badness lies.[PhS # 340]. This is what happens during French revolution when `the general will' took on the shape of abstract universality of freedom that used virtue leading to suspicion for universal terror with human heds coming under the Guillotine like `cabbages under kitchen knife'. `Feurie des Verschnwadens'is the description provided by Hegel to show the culminated act of revolution. With this act, the logic of the revolution turned into its opposite, from the dialectical logic it turned into sheer abstraction, or abstract freedom that was unmediated in the act of Terror dissolved all the earlier promises and determinations, turning the intellectual landscape into a barren desert. It is only at this point that the Spirit falls, turns into abyss, into meaninglessness and consequently, meaningless death.

The destabilization of the dialectic by abstract unmediated negativity of universal freedom would face revolt from `observing instinct of self-conscious reason' in the principle of individual freedom or the opposition between universal liberty as embodied by the state and the individual liberty that was the principle of liberalism.

PhS may also be seen as transformation of preconscious to the fully developed form of consciousness is also in addition to the discovery, creating a product [eidos], or idea-product though work is a mark of general, social labour, which is what makes the `we' in Hegel's philosophy..When Hegel worked out the path to write Phenomenology, Kai is correct in tracing its genealogy to 1801-'02, the organization of that, as demanded by cumulative non-quantified logic, in 1806 did not qualify as Phenomenology to Hegel.However one should not infer that Phenomenology is something of an advance from Philosophy. There is a difference and an opposition resulting in subordination of Phenomenology to Logic or the method proper to Philosophy.


Resemblances are and should be deceptive, fully recognized as intrinsic to aesthetics. But in Philosophy, where the right word may be `meme' [ contentious terrain for sure], yet all such acts remain subordinate to the concept [begriff],when the world is actively involved, as with prayers,with the `Enlightenment Idea' about opinion [doxa]governing the world.In terms of dialectic Hegel broke a barrier of linearity and the work of 1807 was preceded by a leap that could only be found in the Preface where Hegel shows the destabilizing nature of truth as the ravel.

To round up what is being said, there is the difference between Hegel's perception of the product of his labours [and the use of `we' by Hegel contains others in the course of work]and the perception of social labour that produced 750 copies. If that is self-evident then the next unity must be the dynamic unity of these two modes of work and perception all the way to the moment of absolute synthetic, non-oppositional/oppositional, non-differentiated/differentiated unity.That would be the work of Spirit.

Lastly‎, PhS was very much spurred by the 18th c. notion of Education as articulated by Diderot, Voltaire , even Helvetius, Condillac as much as the influence of Hölderlin. I think that the so-called break up between Hegel and Holderlin as caused by latter's failed attempt to assassinate a Guiltier or some political notable has been overstressed. In fact, Holderlin had already retreated to a big depression after his wife's early death leading to madness of a kind. In  a letter to Hegel, Holderlin had made a critique of Fichte's `absolute spirit', which encompassed all reality, resembling post-modern blabber on the absence of any outside.Holderlin made clear that without the object self-consciousness was impossible and without consciousness `I am for myself nothing; absolute self is nothing for me. Hölderlin imparted the notion of Bildung [ popular education] to Geistes. As he wrote to Schelling:" Poetry made me contemplate the Bildung, the formation of character and impulse for improvement.Consciousness of its ground and essence in Geistes/Spirit" provided the material to instinctively inspire him to draft a humanistic journal including poetry.

Hölderlin sought how to make the transition from prose to poetry and, with it, the transience of the body.